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GENERAL INTANGIBLE OR COMMERCIAL TORT: MORAL
RIGHTS AND STATE-BASED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS
COLLATERAL UNDER U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 9
Lars S. Smith*
INTRODUCTION
When the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted Revised Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1998,1 they added a new type of collateral that
could be used as security—commercial torts.2 Prior to the 1998 revision, all
tort claims were excluded as a form of security.3 However, when drafting
Revised Article 9, the drafters included commercial torts as a potential asset in
early drafts.4
Characterizing certain rights as commercial torts can have important
consequences in how a lender will perfect its security interest and whether it
can obtain a secured position in intangible rights acquired after the original
security interest was granted. In addition, the debtor or trustee in bankruptcy
may be able to avoid the effect of a security interest in those assets if the
specific rules governing commercial torts were not followed. For example, if a
particular trade secret is more properly treated as a commercial tort rather than
a general intangible, it is unlikely that the creditor would have a perfected
security interest if the trade secret was created after the security interest
originally attached.5 Even if it were a trade secret that arose before attachment

* Assistant Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, at the University of Louisville. The
author wishes to thank his wife, Barbara, for her strong encouragement and assistance with completing this
Article. The author also wishes to thank his research assistants, Susan Montalvo-Gesser and William Ferrell,
for their hard work while researching and formatting this Article.
1 U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 2 (2002). All citations to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code are, unless
otherwise indicated, to the 2002 edition of Revised Article 9. Revised Article 9 was completed in 1999. “Old
Article 9” refers to the 1995 edition of Uniform Commercial Code Article 9. The Uniform Commercial Code
was last amended in 2003, but this Article does not contain any references to those amendments.
2 Id. § 9-109(d)(12).
3 U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1995) (“Old Article 9”).
4 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment of after-acquired collateral.
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of the original security interest, if not specifically listed in the security
agreement, the creditor would not have a security interest in the trade secret.
This possibility will create a strong incentive for a debtor or trustee in
bankruptcy to attempt to recharacterize the collateral as a commercial tort
claim to avoid the creditor’s security interests in general intangibles.
Under Old Article 9 there was little question that the primary forms of
federally protected intellectual property—patents,6 copyrights,7 and
trademarks8—were treated as general intangibles and capable of being used as
security.9 While there was some debate as to the proper process of perfecting
such an interest,10 the category of collateral was never in dispute.11
While the law was clear on the categories for such types of intellectual
property, several types of intellectual property are either only protected or
defined under state law, or are subject to minimal federal protection. These
intellectual property rights include trade secrets, the right of publicity, rights
against unfair competition, and moral rights.12 Many of these forms of
intangible rights derive from tort law. For example, misappropriation of trade
secrets was included in the first Restatement of Torts, and the definition of
trade secrets from that Restatement is still relied upon by courts to this day.13

6

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000) for the federal law governing protection of patents.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000) for the federal law governing protection of copyrights.
8 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 105-1141 (2000) for the federal law governing protection of trademarks.
9 See, e.g., Aerocon Eng’g, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power Co.), 303 F.3d
1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (copyrights are general intangibles); Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic
Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001) (patent is a general intangible); T.S. Note Co. v. United Kan.
Bank & Trust (In re Topsy’s Shoppes, Inc. of Kan.), 131 B.R. 886, 888–89 (D. Kan. 1991) (trademarks are
general intangibles).
10 See, e.g., In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d at 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that because the
creation of a security interest in a patent does not effect a transfer of ownership in a patent, the Patent Act does
not apply and the security interest should be perfected by filing under Article 9); see also Shubha Ghosh, The
Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellectual Property Optimist Examines Article 9 and
Bankruptcy, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 99 (1997); Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests:
Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645 (1996); Thomas M.
Ward, The Perfection and Priority Rules for Security Interests in Copyrights, Patents, and Trademarks: The
Current Structural Dissonance and Proposed Legislative Cures, 53 ME. L. REV. 391, 407–49 (2001)
(discussing the conflict between Old and Revised Article 9, and the federal intellectual property recording
acts).
11 See generally THOMAS A. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE §§ 1:6-7, 9 (West Group
2003).
12 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (8th ed. 2004) (defining intellectual property to include federally
created rights in trademark, copyright, and patent, and also state-created trade secret rights, publicity rights,
moral rights, and rights against unfair competition).
13 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2005).
7
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To the extent that such intangible rights were defined solely as a right
arising under tort law, they could not be used as security under Old Article 9.14
If a court was willing to protect such intangible rights under Old Article 9, the
only category these rights could fit in to was “general intangible,” which was
the catchall category under Old Article 9.15 For example, trade secrets have
been held to be general intangibles and thus covered by Old Article 9.16
Since Revised Article 9 now includes “commercial torts” as a new category
of collateral, more intangible rights defined as torts can be used as collateral in
a commercial transaction. It is therefore appropriate to reevaluate whether
certain intellectual property rights, which may have been treated as general
intangibles or excluded entirely under Old Article 9, should now be
categorized as commercial torts under Revised Article 9. For example, a trade
secret may be seen as merely a tort protecting certain special relationships,
such as between an employer and employee. If so, the right is more akin to a
tort and not a general intangible.
This Article does two things. First, it explores the extent to which forms of
intellectual property that were not able to be used as security under Old Article
9 are now covered as commercial torts. Second, the Article considers whether
forms of intellectual property, which might have been characterized as general
intangibles under Old Article 9, are more properly characterized as commercial
torts under Revised Article 9.
I. GENERAL INTANGIBLES V. COMMERCIAL TORTS
UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9
A. General Scope of Article 917
The purpose of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is to “provide[]
a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal
property and fixtures.”18 Article 9 does not govern all liens created in personal

14

U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1995) (“Old Article 9”).
Id. § 9-106 & cmt.
16 United States v. Antenna Sys., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (C.D.N.H. 1966).
17 What follows is a short review of the general scope of the regulation of secured transactions as set
forth in Article 9. This review is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the application of Article 9
generally, but rather, a brief review of those concepts contained in Article 9 that are relevant to a discussion of
obtaining and perfecting security interests in general intangibles and commercial torts.
18 U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2002).
15

SMITHGALLEYFINAL

98

1/31/2006 12:28 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

property, but rather, is generally limited to consensual19 security interests20 in
personal property created by debtors for the benefit of creditors to secure
repayment of loans.21 Thus, the creation of a nonconsensual judgment lien in
personal property is governed by law other than Article 9.22 Nevertheless, to
the extent that liens created outside of Article 9 affect the rights of secured
parties in such personal property, such as judgment liens, the relative rights of
the parties will generally be governed by Article 9.23
Personal property subject to a security interest is “collateral” under Article
9.24 When a creditor has been granted a security interest in such collateral, the
creditor becomes a secured party under Article 9.25 The most common method
for a creditor to become a secured party is for the debtor to grant a security
interest in the debtor’s personal property by way of a written security
agreement that describes the collateral.26 Once this is done, the security
interest becomes enforceable against the debtor and attaches to the collateral.27
At this point, the secured party has ensured that, as between the secured party
and the debtor,28 the secured party will be able to seek repayment of the debt
by proceeding against the collateral.29
19 Id. § 9-109 cmt. 10. “With few exceptions (nonconsensual agricultural liens being one), this Article
applies only to consensual security interests in personal property.” Id.
20 “Security Interest” is defined as “an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation.” Id. § 1-201(35).
21 Id. § 9-109(a)(1) & cmt. 2. Article 9 also applies to certain other types of transactions in personal
property not relevant to the topic of this Article, such as agricultural liens, U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(2), and sales of
accounts, id. § 9-109(a)(3).
22 Id. § 9-401(a) & cmt. 6.
23 See, e.g., id. § 9-317 (the rights of lien creditors against secured parties). Certain types of security
interests in personal property, such as those governed by federal law, fall outside of the scope of Article 9. Id.
§ 9-109(c)(1). The relative rights of parties in such a case will be determined by that federal law. See, e.g., id.
§ 9-311(a)(1) & cmt. 2 (giving the example of The Federal Aviation Act). Article 9 defers to such federal law
to the extent that federal law preempts state law. U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 8.
24 Id. § 9-102(a)(12).
25 Id. § 9-109(a)(72).
26 Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
Technically, the debtor would “authenticate” the security agreement.
“Authenticate” includes signing the security agreement, but also allows for a debtor to adopt the agreement by
a method other than signing, such as by electronic communication. Id. § 9-102(a)(7) & cmt. 9(b). “Security
Agreement” is defined as “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.” Id. § 9-102(a)(73).
Article 9 does not require a formal, authenticated security agreement in all cases. A secured creditor, for
example, can obtain an enforceable security interest in particular types of collateral by possessing them. See,
e.g., id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B). Attachment by possession is not possible for either commercial torts or general
intangibles, id. § 9-313, and will not be discussed in this Article.
27 Id. § 9-203(a).
28 A security agreement is also enforceable against purchasers of the collateral and other creditors that
may claim an interest in the collateral. Id. § 9-201(a).
29 See id. § 9-601(a).
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However, to help ensure that the secured party’s security interest has
priority over third parties, such as other secured parties, judgment lien
creditors, and purchasers, the secured party needs to “perfect” its interest.30
The essence of perfection under Article 9 is providing public notice to other
creditors of the existence of the secured party’s security interest in the
collateral.31 To perfect a security interest, the security interest must have
attached, and the secured party must have taken the steps necessary to
perfect.32 In most instances, a secured party will perfect its interest by filing a
financing statement describing the collateral.33 The financing statement is a
form34 that provides basic information about the possible existence of a
security interest by including information such as the debtor’s name, a
description of the collateral, and the name of the secured party.35 Thus, in the
typical secured transaction, the debtor will have executed a security agreement
that describes the collateral and grants a security interest in that collateral to a
secured party, the creditor. Additionally, the secured party will have filed a
financing statement with the central filing office for the state where the debtor
is located.36 The creditor then becomes a perfected secured party.
Once a creditor has taken these steps to become a perfected secured party,
its right to proceeds resulting from a disposition of the collateral after a
default37 will be determined by the creditor’s relative priority with respect to
the collateral. In general, priority is determined by the first to file rule—that is,
a secured party will have greater rights to enforce its security interest in the
collateral if it filed its financing statement before other creditors either filed
30

Id. § 9-308 cmt. 2 states that
[a] perfected security interest may still be or become subordinate to other interests. See, e.g.,
Sections 9-320, 9-322. However, in general, after perfection the secured party is protected against
creditors and transferees of the debtor and, in particular, against any representative of creditors in
insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the debtor.

31

Id. § 9-502 cmt. 2; see also id. § 9-104 cmt. 3 (control as sufficient public notice of security interest).
Id. § 9-308.
33 Id. § 9-310(a). Perfecting by filing is the default method of perfecting a security interest, id., although
there are other methods of perfecting, such as by possession, id. § 9-313. This Article focuses only on
perfection by filing since this is the only method for perfecting a security interest in general intangibles and
commercial torts. Id.
34 Id. § 9-521 (providing a sample form financing statement).
35 Id. § 9-502(a). This is the minimum information needed for the financing statement to be effective.
Additional information will be needed to file the form, such as the address of the debtor. Id. §§ 9-516(b),
9-520(a).
36 Id. § 9-501(a)(2) & cmt. 2 (usually the Secretary of State’s office).
37 Id. § 9-601. “The rights of a secured party to enforce its security interest in collateral after the debtor’s
default are an important feature of a secured transaction.” Id. § 9-601 cmt. 2.
32
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their own financing statements38 or otherwise obtained their liens on the same
collateral.39
B. Characterizing the Collateral
The preceding section describes the basic structure of obtaining and
perfecting a security interest in collateral under Article 9. One stated purpose
of the adoption of Article 9 was to unify the varied methods of creating
security interests in different forms of personal property into a single system.40
Even so, Article 9 retains distinctions among types of personal property for
many purposes. In particular, the requirements for perfection depend upon the
particular type of collateral in question. For example, certain types of
collateral can only be perfected by filing,41 whereas possession is the only
permitted method for others.42 Even as to those forms of collateral that may be
perfected by filing, different requirements may apply.43
Revised Article 9 has an extensive definitional section that defines the
types of collateral it covers.44 To apply the correct rules to a form of
intellectual property, one must determine the type of collateral, which includes
intellectual property. To do so, one must distinguish those types of intellectual
property that are properly categorized as general intangibles from those that
should be categorized as commercial torts under Revised Article 9. This
section discusses the definitions relevant to determining the proper
characterization of intellectual property rights as collateral.

38

Id. § 9-322(a).
Id. § 9-317(a)(2)(B).
40 Id. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (“[Article 9] provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security
interests in personal property.”).
39

Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely on form, are
not retained; the Article applies to all transactions intended to create security interests in personal
property and fixtures, and the single term “security interest” substitutes for the variety of
descriptive terms which had grown up at common law and under a hundred-year accretion of
statutes.
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (1995) (“Old Article 9”).
41 See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2002), which states that filing is the mandatory method of perfection unless
another method of perfection is permitted.
42 See id. § 9-312(b)(3), which states that a security interest in money can only be perfected by
possession.
43 For example, filing is generally not necessary to perfect a security interest in consumer goods if the
secured party advanced the credit necessary to allow the debtor to purchase such goods. Id. § 9-309(a) & cmt.
3.
44 Id. § 9-102.
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1. Definition of Intellectual Property
Intellectual property is not specifically defined under Article 9. The
comments explaining the definition of “general intangibles” mention that
“various categories of intellectual property” are examples of general
intangibles,45 but then fail to describe which categories are included. By using
the phrase “various categories,” one may reasonably conclude that not all
forms of intellectual property are to be characterized as general intangibles.
Thus, Article 9 must look to other law for the definition of intellectual
property.
“Intellectual Property” is a broad concept, often defined to include the
following types of rights: patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, moral
rights, rights of publicity, and rights against unfair competition.46 Thus, it is
commonly accepted that the term “intellectual property” includes more than
just patents, trademarks, and copyrights. The key element binding these types
of rights is that they all relate to products of the human mind or human
intellect.47
From this list, both patents and copyrights are personal property rights
created exclusively by federal law. Patents are governed by Title 35 of the
United States Code,48 which specifically defines them as personal property.49
Title 17 of the United States Code governs the rights granted under federal
copyright law.50 Both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act preempt state law
with respect to the rights covered under each Act.51

45

Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d).
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 308
(3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA]; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th
ed. 1999).
47 MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 46; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (8th ed.
2004).
48 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-76 (2000).
49 Id. § 261.
50 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
51 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (patent law preempts state
law); see 17 U.S.C. § 301 (The Copyright Act expressly preempts “all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in section 106 [] in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression . . . .”). Since the copyright preemption
clause only preempts works that are fixed, works that have not been fixed can only be protected under state
copyright law. Id. § 301(b)(1).
46
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Trademarks, however, are protected under both state52 and federal law.53
The Lanham Act does not preempt state law except to the extent that
registration of a trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
grants nationwide protection even in jurisdictions where the mark has not been
used.54
Many of the other forms of intellectual property, although often referenced
in federal law, are defined by state law. For example, while the Bankruptcy
Code includes trade secrets as a form of intellectual property,55 this federal law
looks to state law to define trade secret.56 Trade secrets are generally protected
under state civil laws such as the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.57 No federal law
protecting trade secrets as commercial assets exists.58 Some types of
intellectual property, such as rights of publicity, are defined under state law but
have no direct protection under federal law. For example,59 there is no
federally recognized right of publicity,60 but violation of the state created right
may give rise to an analogous false endorsement claim under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.61
Moral rights straddle both federal and state law. One form of moral rights
is specifically protected under the Copyright Act—the rights attribution and
integrity for certain visual artists under the Visual Artists Rights Act.62 Moral
rights may also be protected under the common law, § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, or under state law.63
This Article focuses on those types of intellectual property that are created
under state law and moral rights as protected both under federal and state law.
52

See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:1-4 (4th ed.

2004).
53

15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000).
MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 22:2.
55 11 U.S.C. §101(35A) (2000).
56 Harmon v. McGee (In re McGee), 157 B.R. 966, 975 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
57 Unif. Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433–67 (1990).
58 The federal Economic Espionage Act provides for criminal liability for theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1832 (2000), and includes its own definition of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). However, this statute
does not include a private right of action, and so does not create a federal trade secret law similar to the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
59 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY,
§ 6:135 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY]; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 28:14.
60 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, §§ 6:133–34 (2d ed. 2004).
61 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
62 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
63 See infra notes 221–236 and accompanying text for a discussion of moral rights.
54
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Patents, trademarks, and copyrights have historically been treated by courts as
general intangibles under Article 9.64 Since the drafters of Revised Article 9
likely did not intend to alter this understanding,65 such intellectual property
rights are not the focus of this Article.
2. Definition of General Intangible
Article 9 defines a “general intangible” as
any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts,
chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents,
goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters
of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction.
66
The term includes payment intangibles and software.

As can be seen by this definition, a general intangible is a type of collateral
defined in the negative. It is the residual category for personal property
covered by Article 9 that does not fit into any other category.67 Thus, if the
collateral is not included in a specifically defined form of collateral, it will fall
into the general intangible category.
A key requirement is, of course, that the property in question be
“intangible.” The type of collateral included under general intangibles,
however, is narrower than what would normally be defined as “intangible
property.” For example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines intangible property as
property “that lacks a physical existence,”68 such as stock options.69 Stock
options would likely be characterized under Article 9 as investment property,70
thus specifically excluded from the Article 9 definition of general intangible.71

64 See, e.g., Aerocon Eng’g, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power Co.), 303 F.3d
1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (copyrights are general intangibles); Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic
Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001) (patents are general intangibles); Roman Cleanser Co. v.
Nat’l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 943 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984)
(trademarks are general intangibles).
65 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (2000) (“‘General intangible’ is the residual category of personal property,
including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are various
categories of intellectual property . . . .”).
66 Id. § 9-102(a)(42).
67 Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d).
68 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1253 (8th ed. 2004).
69 Id.
70 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49). Specifically, it would be characterized as a “security entitlement” in the
definition of investment property. Id.
71 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
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Therefore, the general intangible category does not include all intangible
property. More specifically, general intangibles exclude collateral that is a
good72 or for which its existence is embodied in some physical object, such as
a document73 or instrument.74 Also excluded are obligations to pay a debt that
are not embodied in a particular physical object, such as accounts receivable or
deposit accounts.75
The comments to section 9-102, the definitional section of Revised Article
9, mention that general intangibles includes “various categories of intellectual
property,”76 but do not explain what those various categories include. Thus,
the definition of general intangible does not necessarily include all forms of
intellectual property.77
3. Definition of Commercial Tort
Article 9 defines “commercial tort claim” as
a claim arising in tort with respect to which: (A) the claimant is an
organization; or (B) the claimant is an individual and the claim: (i)
arose in the course of the claimant’s business or profession; and (ii)
does not include damages arising out of personal injury to or the
78
death of an individual.

Thus, a commercial tort is either a tort where the claimant is an
organization other than an individual79 or a tort where the claimant is an
individual and the tort relates to the person’s business. Specifically excluded
are torts for personal injury or death.80
Commercial torts were added to the categories of collateral covered by
Article 9 in the 1998 revisions. The Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC
72

Id.
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d).
77 WARD, supra note 11, §§ 1:6-7, 9. As noted, it is generally accepted that patents, trademarks, and
copyrights clearly fall within the definition of general intangible. Id.
78 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13).
79 U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (2002). The definition under the pre-revision version of Article 1 is more
cumbersome: “‘Organization’ includes a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency,
business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest,
or any other legal or commercial entity.” Id. § 1-201(28) (1999).
80 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13)(B)(ii) (2000).
73
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(“PEB”) discussed including commercial torts in its 1992 report about the need
to revise Article 9.81 Many commentators had noted that the reason for
excluding torts as collateral under Article 9 did not make sense.82
Additionally, the PEB received two memoranda outlining the reasons why torts
should be included as collateral under Article 9. One important reason was
some lenders were already taking security interests in torts to the extent
permitted under state law.83 While the PEB was not willing to permit all torts
to function as collateral under Article 9, the PEB did broaden Article 9 to
include a subset of torts that relate to a debtor’s business.84
(a) “Arising in Tort”
Revised Article 9 allows the creation of security interests in those forms of
commercial claims that are “arising in tort.”85 This seemingly simple phrase
carries with it subtle complexities. No clear definition of a tort exists beyond
the generally accepted “civil wrong.” Black’s Law Dictionary expands on this
concept, defining a tort as “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for
which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the form of damages; a breach of
a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one
another.”86 Although this definition suggests that all claims outside of contract
law are torts, that interpretation is too broad. Professor Dobbs explained that
“[t]he essence of tort is the defendant’s potential for civil liability to the victim
for harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly the victim’s potential for
compensation or other relief.”87 The key distinction, according to Dobbs, is

81 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE U.C.C., PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 9: REPORT 58–59 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter PEB REPORT].
82 See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, 8 HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-104:12 (2002)
(“In an age of substantial money judgments, the right to pursue a tort claim may be extremely valuable, and
but for public policy impediments in some jurisdictions and the inherent juridical risks involved in pursuing a
tort claim, these rights might well make for good collateral.”); Amanda K. Esquibel, An Article 9 Primer
Regarding Uninsured Collateral Destroyed by a Tortfeasor, 46 KAN. L. REV. 211 (1998); Harold R.
Weinberg, They Came from “Beyond the Pale”: Security Interests in Tort Claims, 83 KY. L.J. 443 (1994).
83 PEB REPORT, supra note 81, 549–88 (Memoranda of Professor Harold R. Weinberg).
84 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 60 (2001). One specific problem with pledging the right to the damages
received from winning a claim for a tort is that there is a long-standing tradition that torts not be assignable.
Id.
85 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13).
86 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (8th ed. 2004).
87 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (2000).
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that torts are concerned with fault and the defendant is usually morally at fault
for the wrong committed.88
Tort law is also concerned with protecting “interests,” which are described
as “a person’s interest in (1) physical security and autonomy; (2) emotional
security and other intangible interests such as privacy and reputation; and (3)
economic security and opportunity.”89 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
notes that the interest protected is “anything which is the object of human
desire.”90 This interest, as understood under tort law, is distinguishable from
the proprietary rights recognized in property law. Tort law protects human
interests that may not be legally recognized as property. For example, the right
to be free from assault is not a property right, but rather an interest protected
under tort law. Thus, whether tort law will protect an interest does not hinge
on the person owning anything.91 There are, of course, some property-based
torts, such as trespass to land.92 Trespass to land, however, is concerned with
“invasions of the interest in the exclusive possession and physical condition of
land.”93 Anyone in exclusive control over property has sufficient possession to
bring a claim for trespass to land, even if the person has no legal right to the
property.94 Thus, the interest protected by this tort is a possessory interest as
opposed to an ownership interest.95

88 Id. This is not universally true, however, because the concept of strict liability, in which proof of fault
is not at issue, is also part of tort law.
89 Id.
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (1965).
91 Id. § 1 cmt. f.

The word “interest” is used in the various Restatements in two senses: the one the sense here
defined, the other denoting the beneficial side of legal relations, both generically to include the
aggregate of “rights,” “powers,” “privileges,” and “immunities,” and distributively to mean any
one of them. There is this fundamental difference between the two usages. As the word “interest”
is used in this Restatement, it carries no implication as to whether it is legally recognized or not.
When used in the second sense, the word “interest” denotes advantages which are legally
recognized as incident to the possession or ownership of property and the like.
Id.
92

Id. § 158.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS scope note to ch. 7.
94 Id. § 157 cmt. b. (“Possession of land may be acquired by one who is not by law entitled to it and
thus, as against another, may not be rightful. Consequently, a disseisor is a possessor from the moment that his
occupancy begins, although as between himself and the true owner, he is not entitled to possession until his
adverse possession has ripened into ownership by lapse of time.”).
95 Id. scope note to ch. 7.
93
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Tort claims generally focus on vindicating a wrongful interference with a
person’s interest in physical, emotional, or economic security.96
Unfortunately, this leaves a great deal of overlap between tort and property
law. For example, trespass to land and trespass to chattels are both torts that
vindicate the interest in being free from wrongful interference with the right of
exclusive possession of property.97 These torts exist, however, to vindicate the
important property law right of exclusive possession.
Many forms of intellectual property have their genesis in tort law, not
property law. For example, modern trademark law is a part of the law of unfair
competition, which was originally considered part of tort law.98 If an
intellectual property right is more aptly characterized as a claim arising in tort,
this will have a dramatic effect on its treatment under Article 9.99
(b) Proceeds v. Commercial Tort
Further confusing the matter, under Article 9, some torts against collateral
are classified as “proceeds.”100 The Article 9 definition of “proceeds” includes
“claims arising out of the loss, . . . interference with the use of, defects or
infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.”101 Therefore, a trespass
to chattels case, while strictly speaking a tort, would be considered proceeds
under Article 9 if the chattel in question were already collateral under the
security agreement.102 This means that where a tort claim is based on acts
against collateral, the rules governing security interests in goods would apply,
not the more restrictive rules for commercial torts. Likewise, an infringement
action for intellectual property is also a proceed. Thus, for a form of intangible
right to be treated solely as a commercial tort, the underlying interest must not
be recognized as a proprietary right that is treated as a general intangible.
96

DOBBS, supra note 87, § 1.
Id. § 4.
98 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 1:15.
99 See infra notes 137–213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consequences of characterizing
collateral as a commercial tort claim.
100 See William J. Murphy, Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in
Intellectual Property, Appendix 10-Commercial Tort Claims, 41 IDEA 477, 477–79 (2002) (distinguishing
“infringement claims offered separately as original collateral (special handling required) from those claims that
become collateral because they are the ‘proceeds’ of general intangible collateral already held by the secured
creditor.”).
101 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(D) (2002) (limiting the value of the claim to the value of the collateral).
102 Id. Of course, if the tort occurred before the debtor granted a security interest to the secured party in
the chattels, such tort would not be proceeds because the chattels would not have been collateral at the time the
tort occurred.
97
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To the extent that a tort claim exists for the violation of some right in
property that is collateral under Article 9, then that claim is proceeds and,
therefore, not a commercial tort.103 The same is true of claims for violations of
the types of intellectual property that are treated as general intangibles. Thus, a
claim for infringement of a trademark subject to a security interest will be
treated as a general intangible because the underlying trademark is treated as
such.104
This means that deciding whether the right exists apart from the tort claim
impacts how the asset is characterized. For example, if a trade secret is held to
be a general intangible, a claim for misappropriation is merely proceeds of the
trade secret. If the court characterizes the right as arising out of the tort
itself,105 however, the asset is the claim itself, and therefore, a commercial tort.
(c) Tort v. Thing in Action
The definition of general intangible in Article 9 includes “things in
action.”106 A thing in action is the English translation for a “chose” in action.107
“A chose in action is a personal right not reduced into possession, but
recoverable by a suit at law.”108 This definition is often interpreted broadly to
include all rights recoverable by suit, which would include torts.109 For
example, licenses of intellectual property are considered to be things in
action.110
While a tort is arguably something recoverable by a suit at law, commercial
torts are specifically excluded from the Article 9 definition of general
intangible.111 Therefore, an intellectual property right that might otherwise be
characterized as a thing in action under the common law could still be treated
as a commercial tort, notwithstanding the inclusion of things in action under
the definition of general intangibles.
103

Id. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds).
Id.; see also WARD, supra note 11, § 1:10.
105 For example, treating a trade secret not as property but as protection for an employer’s interest in
preventing a former employee from using the employer’s confidential information to compete against the
employer.
106 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
107 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed. 2004).
108 63 AM. JUR. 2D Property § 22 (1997).
109 Id. § 23.
110 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d).
111 Id. § 9-102(a)(42). Commercial torts were excluded because they are dealt with as a separate category
of collateral. Id. § 9-102(a)(42) cmt. 5(d).
104
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(d) Right to Assign Commercial Torts and Things in Action
Torts were not assignable at common law.112 As a result, they were not a
useful source of collateral because the creditor could never be assigned
ownership of the claim. That general rule has changed dramatically in recent
years. Most things in action, including torts, are now assignable113 with the
exception of certain types of claims, such as personal torts.114 Non-assignable
personal torts include claims based on assault and battery, personal injury,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, defamation,
conspiracy to injure another’s business, and unfair and deceptive trade
practices.115
The reason personal torts are not usually assignable is that such
assignments are against public policy because they promote champerty.116
Champerty is the transfer of a claim to a third party who then pursues the claim
on his own behalf.117 The purpose of the champerty doctrine was to “prevent
officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by vexatious and
speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of society, lead to corrupt
practices, and prevent the remedial process of the law.”118
Revised Article 9, to the extent that it permits the use of commercial torts
as security, is not intended to change other laws outside of Article 9 regarding
the assignability of a tort claim.119 Therefore, to the extent that the granting of
a security interest in a commercial tort is deemed to be an illegal assignment of
a tort claim as champerty, the assignment would presumably be invalid.

112

Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Assignability of Claim for Legal Malpractice, 40 A.L.R. 4th 684

(1985).
113

6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 53 (2004).
Id. § 63.
115 Id. § 64. Note, in some jurisdictions, no tort is assignable until judgment. Id. § 60 (such as New
Jersey); see, e.g., Vill. of Ridgewood v. Shell Oil Co., 673 A.2d 300, 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
116 Horton v. New S. Ins. Co., 468 S.E.2d 856, 858 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
117 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (8th ed. 2004).
118 Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (citation omitted).
119 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(g) (2002). “Although security interests in commercial tort claims are within its
scope, this Article does not override other applicable law restricting the assignability of a tort claim.” Id; see
also id. § 9-401(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Sections 9-406, 9-407, 9-408, and
9-409, whether a debtor’s rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is governed by law
other than this article.”).
114
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C. Distinguishing Commercial Torts from General Intangibles
Under Article 9, the categories of general intangibles and commercial torts
are mutually exclusive—the collateral may be one or the other, but not both.
This is derived from the definition of general intangible, which specifically
excludes commercial torts.120 Because general intangible is the residual type
of collateral category, it must be determined whether the intellectual property
fits in the commercial tort category. If it does, it cannot be a general
intangible; conversely, if the intellectual property is not a commercial tort, it
must be a general intangible.
To make this determination, two issues must be considered. First, is the
intellectual property right directed at vindicating ancillary interests in the
owner or creator of the right? Second, to what extent is the right fully
alienable? If the right is primarily directed at protecting interests ancillary to
the right as defined and is not alienable, it is likely a commercial tort.
Alternatively, if the intellectual property right consists of exclusive rights
unrelated to the creator or owner and it is fully assignable, it is a general
intangible.
1. Does the Intellectual Property Right Vindicate an Interest Ancillary to
the Underlying Right
Whether an intellectual property right should be treated as a tort rather than
a general intangible is related to whether intangible rights should generally be
treated as property. Professor Ward, in his treatise Intellectual Property in
Commercial Transactions, posits two questions that determine whether an
intangible right is property: “Is the primary or underlying right absolute or corelative? Is the right definable in terms of some underlying res or is it merely a
right of action for a specifically defined wrong?”121
Under Article 9, the issue is not whether the rights are property, however
defined, because Article 9 permits both general intangibles and commercial
torts to function as collateral. Nevertheless, these questions are helpful in
determining the dividing line between an intellectual property right that should
be treated as a commercial tort rather than a general intangible.

120

Id. § 9-102(a)(42).
WARD, supra note 11, § 1:4. Professor Ward includes a third question, not relevant to this discussion,
regarding whether contract rights arising out of intellectual property rights are themselves property. Id.
121
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The essence of the questions posed by Professor Ward is whether the
intellectual property right stands alone, apart from the creator, or instead exists
to protect some ancillary interest of the creator or owner of the right. As
discussed above, tort law is generally focused on vindicating a wrongful
interference with a person’s interest in physical, emotional, or economic
security.122 In this sense, the interests protected by tort law are co-relative in
that the scope of the “right” to be free from a wrongful interference is really
only determined by the nature and degree of the interference.
This is not to suggest that there are never any rights underlying a tort. For
example, the tort of intentional interference with performance of contract by a
third person123 applies where a person “intentionally and improperly
frustrate[s] dealings that have been reduced to the form of a contract.”124 Thus,
this tort supports an underlying contractual right. The claim is not based upon
breach of contract, however, because the tortfeasor is interfering with someone
else’s contract.125 The tort exists to protect a person’s interest in avoiding
wrongful interference by a third party with an enforceable contract, and the
right does not arise until an improper interference has occurred.126 The
quantum of damages from a breach of contract claim can be determined by
reference to the nature and scope of performance agreed upon by the parties in
that contract. The quantum of damages arising from a tortious interference
with a contract cannot truly be valued until the interference has occurred.
Additionally, the quantum of damages is dependent upon the nature of the acts
committed and the harm caused to the claimant.
The comments to Article 9 further illustrate this point. Assume that a
business owns a factory, and that a third party wrongfully causes the business’
factory to explode.127 Clearly the business had an interest in not having its
factory explode and would be able to bring a tort claim against the third party
(either for negligence or for an intentional tort). That does not mean, however,
122

DOBBS, supra note 87, § 1.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1965).
124 Id. § 766 cmt. b.
125 Id. § 766 (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except
a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not
to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the
failure of the third person to perform the contract.”) (emphasis added). The plaintiff may still have a separate
cause of action against the third party (the party to the contract) even though the tortfeasor is liable under this
tort. Id. § 766 cmt. v.
126 See id. § 737 (discussing the elements of what makes an interference improper).
127 U.C.C. § 9-108 cmt. 5 (using the hypothetical given in the comments to Article 9 to explain the
example of a commercial tort).
123
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that the business has an intangible property right in being free from exploding
factories. The rights that the business has relate to the claims that result from
the explosion of the factory. That is, the business has rights, but those rights
are not absolute but rather co-relative, determined by the scope of the violation
of its interest in being free from third parties causing its factories to explode.
When does an intellectual property right exist on its own, and when is it
defined by its relationship to some other interest? In analyzing whether certain
intellectual property rights are better treated as commercial torts under Article
9, the question is whether the intellectual property right in question exists
primarily to remedy a wrong committed against the creator or owner of the
right. If the essence of the intellectual property right is the “right” of the
creator or owner to be free from an interference with that person’s business or
personal interests, it is properly categorized as a commercial tort. If the claim
solely vindicates an exclusive right in the intellectual property asset itself,
however, such right should be treated as a general intangible.
For example, the rights protected under a patent are directed towards the
invention covered by the patent, not the professional or personal interests of
the inventor or assignee. That is not to say that the owner does not benefit
from winning a patent infringement claim. Certainly the owner does benefit in
such a case. However, patent infringement is proven solely based on the
claims contained in the patent, regardless of the identity of the owner or the
owner’s interest in the patent.128 By comparison, an unfair competition claim
(a doctrine often included in the list of intellectual property rights)129 is defined
as a generalized right to be free from wrongful interference with a right to
compete. It is directed at vindicating a particular company’s interest in fair
competition and is proven by showing how a company’s business was harmed
by the wrongful acts of a competitor.130 It is not, however, a stand-alone right
in free competition.131
128 This is not to say that the interests of the patentee or the assignee are irrelevant—they will often impact
the scope of the remedies. However, whether there is infringement in the first instance is not determined based
on such considerations.
129 See infra notes 238–240 and accompanying text.
130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 & cmt. g. (1995).
131 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 674 (1999) (“To
sweep within the Fourteenth Amendment the elusive property interests that are ‘by definition’ protected by
unfair-competition law would violate our frequent admonition that the Due Process Clause is not merely a
‘font of tort law.’” (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976))). The Supreme Court, in analyzing
whether there is a “property right in freedom from a competitor’s false advertising about its own products” for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, held that a tort is not property simply because it
protects a property interest. Id. at 673.
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Thus, where the intellectual property right is easily defined as a separate,
stand-alone right, the value of which is not determined in relation to some
other interest, such right should be characterized as a general intangible.
However, if the rights protected under a form of intellectual property are
primarily directed towards vindicating the interests of the owner or creator of
the right, rather than the creation or protection of the underlying intellectual
property itself, it should be treated as a commercial tort.132
2. Is the Intellectual Property Right Fully Alienable?
If an intellectual property right has been historically recognized as fully
alienable, this suggests that the right should be treated as a general intangible.
For example, patents are statutorily recognized as a form of personal property
that may be fully assigned to an unrelated third party.133 In fact, employees are
often contractually obligated to assign patent rights to their employer,
including pending patent applications.134 Copyrights are almost as fully
alienable as patents, although there is a narrow exception which limits the
alienability for works created by individuals: under the Copyright Act, an
author may reclaim a copyrighted work thirty-five years after a transfer occurs
or the work was published.135 Notwithstanding this narrow exception, it is
generally accepted that copyrights are fully alienable.
Unlike patents and copyrights, many torts are still not assignable,136
particularly those that relate to personal injury. To the extent that an
intellectual property right is not assignable, or its assignability is limited, this
should favor the right being categorized as a commercial tort.
3. How to Apply
The test cannot be applied in a mathematical fashion. First, one has to
determine how a particular intellectual property right fits into the test: Is it a
self contained right, and to what extent is it alienable? Two easy
characterizations exist. If an intellectual property right is both defined without
reference to any ancillary interests of the creator or owner and is fully alienable
132 The distinction is not based upon whether the intellectual property right allows one to exclude others—
the rights described in this Article all permit, to a greater or lesser extent, the right to prevent others from
exercising the right.
133 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
134 DONALD S. CHISUM, 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 22.01, 22.03 (1978).
135 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2000). This right does not cover works made for hire. Id. § 203(a)(1).
136 See supra notes 112–119 and accompanying text.
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under law, it is a general intangible. If, instead, the intellectual property right
exists primarily to support or vindicate a right of the owner or creator and is
not alienable, it is a commercial tort.
Between those extremes, there are many possible variations. One must
weigh and balance which of the two factors is most dominant. For example,
while the right may exist to vindicate personal interests of the creator, it may
be treated in law as fully alienable. In such a case, the courts may see the
power to transfer the right as paramount and characterize the right as a general
intangible. It may be that the answer depends on the particular circumstances
of how the intellectual property right is being used.
II. IMPACT OF CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ASSET
The purpose of Article 9 is to provide a system governing the creation of
consensual security interests in personal property.137 Many important
consequences flow from the characterization of assets under Article 9. To start
with, not every type of collateral that can be termed personal property is
included within the scope of Article 9. A number of categories of assets are
excluded,138 such as the assignment of a claim for wages or salary,139 and tort
claims other than commercial tort claims.140
Even for those assets covered under Article 9, characterization of the
collateral has an impact on the methods and consequences of obtaining a
perfected security interest in collateral. This Article will focus on the
differences between perfecting a security interest in general intangibles and
commercial torts.
A. Attachment
In the event that a debtor is unable to repay a loan, a lender will seek
repayment by seizing and selling the debtor’s assets. Lenders have a choice
when they extend credit whether to obtain a lien on the debtor’s assets to
secure repayment of the loan. If they do not, and the lender is unsecured, then
only upon the issuance of an order of a court will the lender have the authority
to seize such assets. If the lender chooses to be a secured lender, then the
137
138
139
140

U.C.C. § 9-109(a).
Id. § 9-109(d).
Id. § 9-109(d)(3).
Id. § 9-109(d)(12).
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lender will have the debtor grant to such lender a security interest in particular
collateral to hold secure repayment of the loan. A lender seeking to use
personal property to secure repayment must meet the requirements of Article 9
for those types of personal property covered by Article 9. The first step in this
process is to ensure that the security interest attaches to the collateral.
Three elements are generally required for attachment to occur:
•

The lender must have given value, usually by extending credit
to the debtor;

•

The debtor must have rights in the collateral; and

•

The debtor must have agreed to the creation of the security
interest, as evidenced by authorizing a security agreement, by
granting possession to the creditor, or granting control over the
141
collateral to the creditor.

As soon as all three of these conditions are met, the security interest of the
creditor will attach142 and be enforceable between the lender and the debtor.143
The characterization of the collateral is key to determining which methods
of attachment are adequate under the third element of attachment. Because
intellectual property will be characterized as either a general intangible or a
commercial tort, the only acceptable method of evidencing an agreement by
the debtor to the creation of a security interest is by authenticating a security
agreement.144 That is to say, the debtor will usually execute a written
document called a security agreement, which describes the collateral. In this
regard, commercial torts and general intangibles are similar. However, what
constitutes an adequate description in such a security agreement for these
respective types of collateral varies dramatically.
To create an enforceable security interest, the description in the security
agreement must reasonably identify the collateral.145 While a supergeneric146

141

Id. § 9-203(b).
Id.
143 Id. § 9-203(a).
144 A security interest cannot attach in either general intangibles or commercial torts by way of possession
or control. See id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) to (D).
145 Id. § 9-108(a).
146 This term is the heading to U.C.C. § 9-108(c).
142
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description, such as “all collateral,” is not adequate,147 for most collateral the
description can be quite broad. Thus, a description by type of collateral, such
as “all general intangibles,” will be adequate to create a security interest in all
of the debtor’s intellectual property that is characterized as a general
intangible.148 That is, a description listing general intangibles will create a
security interest in all of the debtor’s patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
The same is not true for commercial torts.149 A listing by type of collateral,
such as “all commercial torts,” will be inadequate. For commercial torts, the
description must be more specific; however, not all that much detail is
required. The official comments to section 9-108 provide the following
explanation:
[A] description such as ‘all tort claims arising out of the explosion of
debtor’s factory’ would suffice, even if the exact amount of the
claim, the theory on which it may be based, and the identity of the
tortfeasor(s), are not described. (Indeed, those facts may not be
150
known at the time.)

Nevertheless, this requires the lender to provide a description that is more
specific than typical boilerplate provision. The justification mentioned in the
comments is that the drafters did not want to allow a debtor inadvertently to
encumber commercial tort claims.151 As a result, a secured party who wants to
take a security interest in a form of intellectual property that is characterized as
a commercial tort claim must list the claim with more specificity than
“commercial tort claims.”
An interesting question is whether a description of a commercial tort is
adequate even if the debtor does not yet know it has occurred. For example,
would a description such as “all tort claims arising from unfair competition by
a competitor against the debtor” be adequate where the debtor is not aware of
any specific acts of competitors constituting unfair competition? The example
of the factory explosion provided in the comments to section 9-108 states that

147

U.C.C. § 9-108(c).
Id. § 9-108(b)(1).
149 Id. § 9-108(e).
150 Id. § 9-108 cmt. 5.
151 Id. The drafters also included a requirement for more specific descriptions regarding consumer
transactions covering “consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity account.”
Id. § 9-108(e)(2).
148
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the lender does not have to know the precise theory of liability or identity of
the tortfeasor for the description to be adequate.152
This description for unfair competition claims would appear adequate
considering the example, and function to capture all unfair competition tort
claims existing at the time of creation of the security interest, even if the debtor
did not know that the torts had occurred. This description is distinguishable
from the example, because the debtor knows that an explosion has occurred at
its factory, even if it does not know the precise nature of the tort claims that the
debtor will be able to bring. By comparison, if the “all unfair competition
claims” description does not relate to specific acts causing a loss to the
company, such a description would presumably be akin to a description by
type, not a description of a specific incident giving rise to a commercial tort
claim.
B. Perfection
Perfection is the method by which the secured party attempts to ensure that
its security interest in collateral is superior to the claims of other parties that
have an interest in the same collateral.153 That is to say, if a secured party has
not perfected its security interest, Article 9 sets out which other creditors and
third parties, such as purchasers, will have a superior interest in the
collateral.154 In order for a creditor to perfect, its security interest must have
attached and the creditor must have taken all steps necessary to perfect that
attachment.155
Depending on the type of collateral, Article 9 establishes several different
methods to perfect. In most cases, the required method of perfecting a security
interest is filing a financing statement.156 Article 9 allows perfection through
other means,157 however, for certain types of collateral. Those methods

152

Id. § 9-108 cmt. 5.
Perfecting a security interest does not guarantee that a creditor’s interest will be superior to all other
interests. For example, a creditor’s perfected security interest will be subordinate to another creditor’s
perfected security interest if that other creditor filed its financing statement first. Id. § 9-322(a)(1).
154 Id. §§ 9-317, 9-322. “The security interests given priority under Section 9-322 and the other sections
to which it refers take priority in general even over a perfected security interest. A fortiori they take priority
over an unperfected security interest.” Id. § 9-317 cmt. 3.
155 Id. § 9-308(a).
156 Id. § 9-310(a).
157 Id. § 9-310(b).
153
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include automatic perfection,158 perfection by possession,159 and perfection by
control.160 Because none of these additional methods apply to general
intangibles or commercial tort claims, the only method to perfect in either case
is by filing a financing statement.161
To perfect by filing, the creditor must file a properly completed “financing
statement”162 in the correct filing office, as determined by the law governing
perfection of the particular type of collateral. While some variations on where
to file may exist, whether a form of intellectual property is characterized as a
commercial tort claim or a general intangible will not have any impact on the
method of perfecting by filing.
First, the law governing perfection of general intangibles and commercial
tort claims is determined by the location of the debtor.163 This is the default
rule for most collateral,164 although there are exceptions.165 However, none of
those exceptions apply to general intangibles or commercial tort claims.166
Therefore, if the debtor is an individual, the law governing perfection for either
of these types of collateral will be determined by the debtor’s principal
residence.167 If the debtor is an organization, the law governing perfection will

158 Id. § 9-309. This is also referred to as the “perfection-upon-attachment” rule. Id. § 9-309 cmt. 2. A
purchase money security interest in consumer goods can be perfected this way. Id. § 9-309(1).
159 Id. § 9-313. Perfection by possession is permitted for tangible negotiable documents, goods,
instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper. Id. § 9-313(a).
160 Id. § 9-314. Perfection by control is permitted for investment property, deposit accounts, letter-ofcredit rights, or electronic chattel paper. Id. § 9-314(a).
161 Cf. PETER F. COOGAN ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC § 19.01[2] (2005).
162 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(39).
163 Id. § 9-301(1).
164 Id. § 9-301 cmt. 4 (“Paragraph (1) contains the general rule: the law governing perfection of security
interests in both tangible and intangible collateral, whether perfected by filing or automatically, is the law of
the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location, as determined under Section 9-307.”).
165 Id. § 9-301 cmt. 5.

The general rule is subject to several exceptions. It does not apply to goods covered by a certificate
of title (see Section 9-303), deposit accounts (see Section 9-304), investment property (see Section
9-305), or letter-of-credit rights (see Section 9-306). Nor does it apply to possessory security
interests, i.e., security interests that the secured party has perfected by taking possession of the
collateral (see paragraph (2)), security interests perfected by filing a fixture filing (see
subparagraph (3)(A)), security interests in timber to be cut (subparagraph (3)(B)), or security
interests in as-extracted collateral (see paragraph (4)).
Id.
166
167

Id.
Id. § 9-307(b)(1).
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be determined by its place of business168 or, if the organization has more than
one place of business, the location of its chief executive office.169
Second, the proper place to file a financing statement for either general
intangibles or commercial tort claims is the filing office designated by the
version of section 9-501170 that the state has adopted. Generally it is the
Secretary of State’s office.171
Third, the creditor must complete a sufficient financing statement. To be
sufficient, the financing statement must provide the name of the debtor, the
name of the creditor, and indicate the collateral covered.172 Because the
Article 9 system for recording security interests is designed to provide notice
of the possible existence of a security interest, and not to establish that security
interest itself, very little information is required for a sufficient financing
statement.173 As stated in the official comments, “[t]he notice itself indicates
merely that a person may have a security interest in the collateral indicated.
Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the
complete state of affairs.”174
Thus, unlike the security agreement, where a supergeneric description of
collateral is insufficient,175 a financing statement is sufficient even if it merely
describes the collateral as “all assets or all personal property.”176 If the
creditor chooses to use a more specific listing of collateral, however, any asset
not included in the description would not be perfected.177 Therefore, if the
secured party describes the collateral as covering “general intangibles,” this
would not suffice to perfect an interest in commercial tort claims.

168

Id. § 9-307(b)(2).
Id. § 9-307(b)(3).
170 Id. § 9-501.
171 Id. § 9-501(a) & legislative note. Old Article 9 allowed a state to require local filing of financing
statements. However, local filing was eliminated in favor of a central filing system, except in limited cases
such as real estate related collateral and transmitting utilities. Id. § 9-501(a) cmt. 2.
172 Id. § 9-502(a).
173 Id. § 9-502 cmt. 2.
174 Id.
175 Id. § 9-108(c).
176 Id. § 9-504(2).
177 Id. § 9-504 cmt. 2 (“To comply with Section 9-502(a), a financing statement must ‘indicate’ the
collateral it covers.”).
169
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C. After-Acquired Property
Whether a form of intellectual property is a general intangible or
commercial tort claim will have a significant impact on whether a creditor can
have a security interest in after-acquired intellectual property. After-acquired
property is property acquired by a debtor after the security interest has
attached. If there is a clause in the security agreement covering after-acquired
property, such security interest will attach to future assets of the debtor upon
acquisition.178 Of course, the security interest only attaches to those types of
collateral described in the security agreement. For example, the security
agreement might describe the collateral as “all goods, now owned or hereafter
acquired by the debtor.” All goods acquired by the debtor after the effective
date of the security agreement would be included as collateral.
There are two types of collateral for which a security interest may not
attach under an after-acquired property clause: consumer goods acquired more
than ten days after the creditor gives value179 and commercial tort claims.180
As explained in the official comments, “[i]n order for a security interest in a
tort claim to attach, the claim must be in existence when the security
agreement is authenticated.”181 What is meant by “in existence” is not
explained in the comments to section 9-204. However, the comments to
section 9-108 state, under Section 9-204, “an after-acquired collateral clause in
a security agreement will not reach future commercial tort claims. It follows
that when an effective security agreement covering a commercial tort claim is
entered into the claim already will exist.”182
Thus, it seems clear that the facts sufficient to create liability under a
commercial tort claim must have already occurred at the time the security
agreement is executed. Note, however, that the description of the commercial
tort claim does not need to be very exact to be sufficient.183
This limitation is not applicable to general intangibles; an after-acquired
property clause covering general intangibles will create a security interest in

178

Id. § 9-204(a) cmt. 2.
Id. § 9-204(b)(1).
180 Id. § 9-204(b)(2).
181 Id. § 9-204 cmt. 4.
182 Id. § 9-108 cmt. 5.
183 See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements for an adequate
description of a commercial tort.
179
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any kind of general intangible. Therefore, a creditor will clearly prefer that
intellectual property be treated as a general intangible.
D. Default Under Article 9
If a debtor defaults under its agreement with the secured party,184 the
secured party may enforce its security interest in accordance with the default
provisions of Article 9.185 A secured party has the right to enforce its security
interest using either the judicial procedures for foreclosure permitted in the
jurisdiction186 or the self-help repossession powers available in Article 9.187
Whether an intellectual property right is characterized as a general
intangible or a commercial tort claim will have little bearing on the ability to
repossesses the collateral. Given that all intellectual property represents a form
of intangible asset, the difficulties will be the same, because a secured party
cannot physically possess, and thus cannot repossess, the collateral.188
E. Bankruptcy
As summarized by Professor Ward,
[b]ankruptcy is a procedure within the structure of federal statutory
law that provides the honest debtor with a discharge from existing
debt in exchange for the orderly marshaling of the debtor’s assets and
either the restructuring or the sale and division of those assets for the
189
general benefit of creditors.

The full application of the Bankruptcy Code as it pertains to debtors that own
intellectual property is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article
will focus on the strong arm powers of the trustee in a chapter 7 bankruptcy,190

184 “Default” is not defined in Article 9. Instead, what constitutes a default is determined by agreement
between the parties. Id. § 9-601 cmt. 3.
185 Id. §§ 9-601 to 9-628.
186 Id. § 9-601(a).
187 Id. § 9-609.
188 See generally WARD, supra note 11, §§ 3:22-34 (discussing the issues relating to repossession of
intellectual property under Article 9).
189 Id. § 4:1. Professor Ward’s treatise discusses in detail the process and effect of filing for bankruptcy
by a debtor that has intellectual property assets. See id. §§ 4:1-136. This article will only discuss the
bankruptcy laws as they pertain to the effect of characterizing the collateral as a commercial tort.
190 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-728 (2000).
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and the use of those powers by a debtor in possession filing for reorganization
under chapter 11.191
When the debtor files for bankruptcy, this immediately causes the creation
of a bankruptcy estate.192 The estate includes almost all of the debtor’s legal
and equitable interests in property,193 subject to certain limited exceptions.194
Because this definition includes intangible property and the debtor’s claims
against others, intellectual property195 and commercial tort claims are property
of the estate.196
Once the debtor has filed for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code
immediately establishes an automatic stay.197 The automatic stay stops all
collection activity by a secured party, including the commencement198 or
continuation199 of an action to foreclose on the assets of the debtor and
prohibiting the secured party from repossessing collateral.200 Notwithstanding
the stay, a secured creditor can make a claim that it has a perfected security
interest in the property of the debtor, and therefore should be granted relief
from the stay in order to take possession and sell that property before the case
is completed.201
To avoid this, a debtor (or trustee in a chapter 7 liquidation) has two main
options. First, in a chapter 11 case the debtor can challenge the request for
relief from the stay by arguing that such property is necessary for the
191

Id. §§ 1101-1146.
Id. § 541(a).
193 Id. § 541(a)(1).
194 Id. § 541(b).
195 Intellectual property is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as follows: “‘intellectual property’ means—
(A) trade secret; (B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C) patent application; (D)
plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of
title 17; to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law.” Id. § 101(35A).
Note that this definition does not include trademarks, moral rights, or other rights typically included in
the broad category of intellectual property. This has little significance for purposes of this Article, however,
because the Bankruptcy Code definition of intellectual property applies only with respect to § 365(n), which
deals with the right of the bankruptcy trustee to reject certain executory license agreements where the debtor is
a licensor of such intellectual property. Id. § 365(n).
196 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 82 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868 (“The scope of
this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, [and] causes
of action . . . .”).
197 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
198 Id. § 362(a)(1).
199 Id. § 362(a)(2).
200 Id. § 362(a)(3).
201 Id. § 362(d).
192
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reorganization of the business.202 The bankruptcy court must conduct a
hearing on the nature of the property and its value. The court could grant relief
from the stay, which would require the debtor to deliver the property to the
secured borrower,203 or, if the court finds the property is necessary for the
reorganization of the debtor, order the borrower to grant the secured lender
adequate protection204 of the value of the secured party’s security interest,
usually in the form of additional liens on other property.205
The other possibility is for the trustee in a chapter 7 case, or the debtor as a
debtor in possession in a chapter 11 reorganization,206 to challenge the validity
of the secured party’s perfected security interest. The trustee may do so
because the trustee is deemed to be a hypothetical creditor whose lien attached
to all of the property of the debtor at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.207 This hypothetical creditor status allows the trustee (and thus the
debtor in possession) to avoid any security interest that would not have priority
over a lien creditor, as of the filing date.208 Applying this rule to Article 9, if
the secured party’s security interest is not perfected at the time of filing
bankruptcy, or if the secured party has not filed a financing statement and
obtained a security agreement, each adequately describing the collateral as of
the date of filing, then the trustee would have priority over the secured
creditor.209
If an intellectual property right is properly characterized as a commercial
tort, the trustee will be able to argue that under U.C.C. section 9-108, the
description in the security agreement would have to describe the particular
claim specifically in order for it to have attached and be perfected.210 If it has
not, then the trustee would have priority under U.C.C. section 9-317(a)(2). If
so, the trustee could avoid the creditor’s security interest in the intellectual
property,211 allowing the trustee to use and sell that intellectual property right
for the benefit of the unsecured creditors in a chapter 7 liquidation. Further, if
202

See id. § 362(d)(2)(B).
See id. § 362(d).
204 See id. § 362(d)(1).
205 Id. § 361(2).
206 Id. § 1107. In general, the debtor may exercise the powers of the trustee in bankruptcy when acting as
a debtor-in-possession. Id. § 1107(a).
207 Id. § 544(a).
208 Id. § 544(b)(1).
209 U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) & (B) (2002).
210 See supra notes 141177 and accompanying text for a discussion of attachment and perfection of a
security interest in a commercial tort.
211 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).
203
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the intellectual property right is characterized as a commercial tort claim, it
cannot cover any such rights acquired after the effective date of the security
interest, leaving all such intellectual property free of even an otherwise
perfected security interest in commercial tort claims.212
If the debtor is acting as a debtor in possession in a chapter 11
reorganization, the debtor can make the same arguments. Instead of the assets
becoming available to the trustee to pay off the unsecured creditors, however,
the debtor remains in possession of the intellectual property for use in the
reorganization.213 Thus, the debtor retains control over the intellectual
property without concern about having to surrender any intellectual property
right to a secured creditor.
III. MORAL RIGHTS AND STATE-BASED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TRADE
VALUES AS ASSETS IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Numerous articles have been written about the issues surrounding the use
of the primary forms of intellectual property rights as collateral (namely
patents, trademarks, and copyrights).214 While there are thorny issues regarding
the applicability of the Article 9 system for perfecting a security interest in
such assets,215 they have been discussed by commentators216 and reviewed by
the courts.217 In particular it is generally well settled that these assets are
treated as general intangibles under Article 9.218 Thus, these assets are beyond
the scope of this Article.
However, less attention has been paid to the use of secondary intellectual
property rights in commercial transactions, such as moral rights or rights

212

See supra Part II.C. for a discussion of the after-acquired property rules applicable to commercial torts.
11 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
214 See generally Robert S. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral - Patents, Trade Secrets,
Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 BUS. LAW 1567 (1981); Haemmerli, supra note 10; Ward, supra note 10.
215 For example, it has been held that priority and perfection for copyrights registered with the Copyright
Office are determined under the Copyright Act. See Nat’l Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of
Denver (In re Peregrine Entm’t, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 203–07 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990). However, the Ninth
Circuit has held that where the copyrights have not yet been registered, the state Article 9 system of perfection
and priority governs. See Aerocon Eng’g, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power Co.), 303
F.3d 1120, 1126–31 (9th Cir. 2002).
216 See, e.g., WARD, supra note 11, §§ 1:6-9; see also, PEB REPORT supra note 81, app. at 525–47.
217 See In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d at 1126–31.
218 See WARD, supra note 11, at §§ 1:6-9.
213
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created under unfair competition law.219 This Article considers whether
secondary forms of intellectual property, broadly defined as moral rights,
should instead be classified as commercial tort claims.
A. Moral Rights
Under American law, protection for moral rights derives primarily from
treaty obligations; however, there is some protection for limited forms of moral
rights under state law.220 Moral rights are first and foremost a creation of the
civil law system.221 Under continental European law, there exists special
recognition of the rights of authors, which exceed the copyright law, referred
to in France as the drôit moral.222 Moral rights are generally considered to
have three aspects: the right of attribution, the right of integrity, and the right
of withdrawal.223
The right of attribution, or more fully, the right of attribution and paternity,
is “the right of an author to receive credit as the author of a work, to prevent
others from falsely being named [an] author, and to prevent use of the author’s
name in connection with works the author did not create.”224 The right of
integrity gives the author the right to prevent mutilation of the author’s
work.225 Finally, the right of withdrawal gives the author the right to remove a
work from distribution if “it no longer represents the views of the author.”226
One of the key components of moral rights is that they are not assignable.
Therefore, they must remain with the author. An author may waive his or her
moral rights in a particular work with respect to a particular person, but the

219 Although trademark law is commonly thought of as a subset of the law of unfair competition as well,
nevertheless it is considered a primary form of intellectual property, and thus, outside the scope of this Article.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995).
220 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02[A] (1978); Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5–
16 (1985).
221 See Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199 (1995).
222 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 386
(2d ed. 1995).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. The Berne Convention Article 6bis does not require a country to adopt the right of withdrawal.
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8D.01[B].

SMITHGALLEYFINAL

126

1/31/2006 12:28 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

author cannot generally transfer the rights of attribution, integrity, or
withdrawal.227
The Berne Convention, to which the United States adheres, requires that a
signatory nation include moral rights.228 The United States did not adopt the
Berne Convention as a self executing treaty; instead, the United States acceded
to the treaty by adopting implementing legislation.229 In doing so, Congress
initially made no changes to the copyright law to include any provisions for
protection of moral rights. Instead, Congress believed that the patchwork of
state laws and section 43(a) to the Lanham Act provided equivalent protection
to the formal moral rights required under Berne.230 Whether this complies with
the requirements of Berne is disputed,231 especially since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.232
However, Congress later adopted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(“VARA”).233 VARA provides the moral rights of attribution and integrity to
artists that produce limited-number works of visual arts.234 VARA is limited to

227 Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2023 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 17, 2000) (“It is undisputed by the parties that moral rights are inalienable and unassignable.”); WILLIAM
F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 137 (1994); Kwall, supra note 220, at 5. See generally STEPHEN P.
LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY §§ 272-287 (1938); NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8.21[A], at 8-249; Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in
the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 559–72 (1940).
228 International Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1896, art.
6bis, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which shall be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”) Only the rights of attribution and integrity are required. See NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 220 § 8D.01[B].
229 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8D.02[C].
230 Id. § 8D.02[D][1]; Kwall, supra note 220, at 17–33.
231 NIMME & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8D.02[D][1].
232 539 U.S. 23 (2003). In Dastar, the Court held that Lanham Act’s section 43(a) prohibition against
false statement of origin relates to the origin of the manufacture of an item, not a requirement of attribution of
the work to the original author. Id. at 36–38. This puts earlier holdings such as Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Co’s., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), and Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981), often
cited as examples of how moral rights are protected in the United States under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, into doubt. David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right
Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 45 n.263 (2004).
233 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Congress did not enact VARA for the purposes of complying with Berne,
although it was noted that the rights granted to visual artists under VARA were “analogous to those protected
by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention . . . .” H.R. REP. 101-514, pt. I (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
234 17 U.S.C. § 106A. A “work of visual art” is generally defined as a work consisting of no more than
200 signed and consecutively numbered copies. Id. § 101.
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works of visual art, such as painting and sculpture.235 Despite this limited
applicability of VARA, the rights protected under VARA represent the clearest
example of protection of moral rights in the United States.
Moral rights seem to represent the clearest example of intellectual property
rights that should be treated as commercial torts under Article 9. First, the
rights of attribution and integrity as recognized under U.S. law are designed to
protect the individual artist’s personal interests and professional reputation—
not to protect a right embodied in the work itself. In particular, the purpose of
protecting moral rights is consistent with the concept of “arising in tort” as
described in the Article 9 definition of commercial torts. Protecting an artist’s
interest in attribution and integrity conforms well with tort law’s concern with
“(1) physical security and autonomy; (2) emotional security and other
intangible interests such as privacy and reputation; and (3) economic security
and opportunity.”236
Second, due to the inability of an artist to assign his or her moral rights,
such as under VARA,237 these rights lack an important aspect of a property
right. Although the right of attribution clearly grants the artist the right to
“exclude” others from using the artist’s name without permission, this right to
exclude is not alienable. Therefore, moral rights do not fit the concept of an
general intangible under Article 9. Rather moral rights fit the concept of a
commercial tort.
B. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition238
Unfair competition is often listed as a form of intellectual property right.
However, the doctrine of unfair competition is more aptly described as the
category of rights protecting against harm to one’s business from another’s
unscrupulous business practices.239
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition divides the types of claims
for unfair competition into three general categories: deceptive marketing,
trademark infringement, and appropriation of intangible trade values. In
addition to those specific types of common law protections against unfair
competition, the Restatement further includes a catch-all type of claim for “the
235
236
237
238
239

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8D.06[A].
DOBBS, supra note 87, § 1.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
Cf. id. § 1 cmt. 1.
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acts or practices of the actor [which] are actionable by the other under federal
or state statutes, international agreements, or general principles of common law
apart from those considered in this Restatement.”240 As noted in the
introduction, trademarks have been generally accepted as general intangibles,
and are therefore outside the scope of this Article. The following sections will
analyze the claims that fall into the remaining sections of the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition, namely deceptive marketing and appropriation
of intangible trade values, including misappropriation, trade secrets, and right
of publicity.
C. Deceptive Marketing
1. Definition
As explained by the Restatement:
Competitive markets cannot operate efficiently unless consumers
have access to information about the goods and services offered by
competing sellers. Much of the information available to prospective
purchasers is provided by sellers in the form of advertising. If the
message that it communicates is accurate, advertising can function as
a convenient, low-cost source of information that assists consumers
to choose intelligently among competing products. False or deceptive
advertising, however, can result in improvident expenditures or force
consumers to spend additional resources in an effort to acquire more
241
reliable information.

The essence of a deceptive marketing claim is that a business has made
representations about its goods or services which are likely to mislead or
deceive potential customers.242 A competitor has a cognizable claim when
such business’s representations are material to prospective purchasers’ conduct
and it is reasonable to believe that this will cause a diversion of trade from, or
harm to the goodwill of, such competitor.243 The claims can take the form of
misrepresentations relating to source, in the form of passing off244 or reverse
240

Id. § 1(b).
Id. § 1 cmt. d.
Id. § 2.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.

241
242
243
244

The misrepresentations that are proscribed by this Section cause prospective purchasers to believe
that another person is associated with the actor or with the goods or services marketed by the actor,
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passing off.245 Also included are misrepresentations, other than as to source, in
marketing the goods or services of another that will cause harm to the product
or manufacturer of the product.246
The essence of the right against unfair competition is that a business has a
legitimate commercial interest in the right to compete freely based on the
merits of its product and the right to be free from harm to its goodwill or
reputation.247 Thus, the right is that a business’s competitors will not
misrepresent the nature or source of their own products. This right does not
include a cause of action by the business for misrepresentations as to the
business’s products by its competitors. Such an action would be brought under
tort law as a product disparagement claim or trade libel under sections 623A to
652 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.248 An action for deceptive
marketing can be brought under either state law or under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.249
In proving its case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s statements
about its own products are likely to deceive or mislead “prospective
purchasers.”250 Prospective purchaser is a broad concept that includes the
defendant’s immediate customers, customers of its suppliers, and also
professional buyers and purchasing agents of the defendant’s customers.251
Those prospective purchasers have to be influenced in their purchasing
decision in some material fashion—in a way that is likely to cause a “diversion

thus placing the other’s reputation at risk and diverting to the actor the benefit of the other’s good
will.
Id. § 4 cmt. a.
245 Id. § 5. “The misrepresentations of source that are the subject of this Section differ from those
described in the preceding Section in that they result in the passing off, not of the actor’s goods as those of
another, but of another’s goods as those of the actor.” Id. § 5 cmt. a.
246 Id. § 6.
This Section applies the general principle stated in § 2 to situations in which the representation
relates to goods or services truthfully identified as originating from another. In the typical case, the
misrepresentation concerns goods marketed under the other’s trademark, but the other’s
association with the goods or services may also be communicated to prospective purchasers in any
manner.
Id. § 6 cmt. a.
247 Id. § 2 cmt. a.
248 Id. § 2 cmt. c (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A - 652).
249 Id. § 2 introductory note.
250 Id. § 2 cmt. d.
251 Id.
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of trade” from, or harm to the good will of, the plaintiff.252 Statements that are
mere puffery are not actionable.253
2. False Advertising Vindicates the Interest a Business Suffers from the
Loss of Sales or Harm to Its Goodwill
The interest protected by the deceptive marketing cause of action under the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is directed towards preventing the
diversion of sales to a competitor that misleads the public about the
competitor’s own products or hurts the “business reputation or good will of
another.”254 As noted in the comments to section 2,
[t]he use of deceptive representations in the marketing of goods and
services may also cause injury to the legitimate commercial interests
of other sellers by unfairly depriving them of the opportunity to
compete on the merits of their products in the marketplace or by
255
threatening harm to their reputation and good will.

This interest is clearly co-relative; defined by the extent to which a
competitor has misstated the facts about its products. Until the competitor has
done so, the business does not have a right to exclude the competitor. All
statements about the competitor’s products are protected, including puffery.
Once the competitor’s statements rise to the level of a material misstatement
about its product that is likely to influence consumers’ purchasing decisions,
the business has a claim and the nature of its rights can be determined.256
3. Right to Be Free of Deceptive Advertising Held Not a Property Right
Although whether an intellectual property right is treated as a general
intangible or commercial tort claim under Article 9 is not directly related to
whether such right is treated as property, the issues are closely related. To the
extent that courts have held that an intellectual property right is not property,

252

Id. § 3.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Mere puffing,
advertising ‘that is not deceptive for no one would rely on its exaggerated claims,’ is not actionable under §
43(a).”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3 cmt. d (1995).
254 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3 cmt. f.
255 Id. § 2 cmt. a.
256 Id. § 3(a); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974)); U.S. Healthcare, 898
F.2d at 922.
253
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this supports the conclusion that it should be treated as a commercial tort claim
under Article 9.
The United States Supreme Court considered whether the right to be free
from deceptive advertising is a property right recognized under Lanham Act
section 43(a). In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board,257 a New Jersey bank brought suit against the
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, an agency of the
State of Florida, which marketed a prepaid tuition plan. Specifically, College
Savings Bank alleged that Florida Prepaid made material misstatements about
Florida Prepaid’s savings program in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.258 In order for the claim to survive, Florida’s sovereign immunity would
have to have been abrogated under the Eleventh Amendment.259 College
Savings Bank claimed that Congress had validly done so by enacting the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act260 (“TRCA”) under Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment power to prevent states from depriving persons of their
property without due process of law.261 College Savings described its property
rights as follows: “(1) a right to be free from a business competitor’s false
advertising about its own product, and (2) a more generalized right to be secure
in one’s business interests.”262
The Supreme Court stated that “[n]either of these qualifies as a property
right protected by the Due Process Clause.”263 As to the first claimed property
right, the court held that there was no property interest because there was no
right to exclude others under a right to be free from false advertising.264 In
particular “Florida Prepaid’s alleged misrepresentations concerning its own
products intruded upon no interest over which petitioner had exclusive
dominion.”265 Thus, there is no property interest in being free from unfair
competition, as a general matter, at least with respect to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the petitioner
could not cite to any cases standing for such a proposition.266
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

527 U.S. 666 (1999).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 670–72. College Savings Bank also argued that Florida waived its sovereign immunity. Id.
Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 672.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id.
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As to the second claimed property interest, the Supreme Court held that
although there were property rights in the assets of a business, such as its
goodwill, there was no property interest in the right to conduct a business.267
The Court reasoned that “business in the sense of the activity of doing
business, or the activity of making a profit is not property in the ordinary
sense—and it is only that, and not any business asset, which is impinged upon
by a competitor’s false advertising.”268
Although not directly related to the issue of how a claim of false
advertising should be handled under Article 9, the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Florida Prepaid is illustrative of the fact that a claim of unfair competition
is in the nature of a personal claim, which should be treated as a commercial
tort rather than a general intangible.
4. A False Advertising Claim is Generally Not Alienable
The tort of unfair competition is commonly cited as an example of the kind
of rights that are non-assignable.269 Such a right is deemed to be personal in
nature, and thus should not be assignable.270 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition makes no statement with regard to the assignment of such claims,
but since it is an expansion of the false advertising rules contained in section
761 of the Restatement of Torts, presumably the same reasoning would
apply.271 Thus, given that a claim for deceptive advertising is generally treated
as personal in nature, and not usually alienable, it should be a commercial tort
claim and not a general intangible.
D. Appropriation of Trade Values
1. General Principles
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition rejects the general
recognition of exclusive rights in intangible trade values, instead adopting a

267

Id. at 675.
Id.
269 See, e.g., Horton v. New S. Ins. Co., 468 S.E.2d 856, 858 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Vinson & Elkins v.
Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 396 (Tex. App. 1997) (explaining that Texas law assumes that causes of action are
generally assignable, however, no assignment of a claim of a violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is
permitted for policy reasons); 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 53 (2004).
270 Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 413 S.E.2d 268, 271–72 (N.C. 1992); 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 53
(2004).
271 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 reporters’ note (1995).
268
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general right to copy that is subject to a series of specified exceptions.272 The
general rule is stated as follows:
One who causes harm to the commercial relations of another by
appropriating the other’s intangible trade values is subject to liability
to the other for such harm only if:
(a) the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the
other’s trade secret under the rules stated in §§ 39-45; or
(b) the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the
commercial value of the other’s identity under the rules stated
in §§ 46-49; or
(c) the appropriation is actionable by the other under federal or
state statutes or international agreements, or is actionable as a
breach of contract, or as an infringement of common law
273
copyright as preserved under federal copyright law.

The emphasis in the general rule is that there should be no liability for a
competitor in using the intangible trade values of another unless there has been
a misappropriation of that trade value. This emphasis on misappropriation
sounds in tort, much as the right to be free from deceptive advertising does, as
discussed above. Assuming this is true, this leaves some room to argue that
some intellectual property “assets” are best treated as commercial torts under
Article 9 rather than general intangibles.
2. Trade Secrets
(a) Information Protected as Secret
(i) Definition of Trade Secret
Trade secret protection is generally a creature of state law. While certain
federal statutes create criminal liability for theft of trade secrets,274 trade
secrets are primarily protected under state civil law.275 There are three main
formulations for protecting trade secrets under state law—one is statutory and
the other two are common law. First, legislation can protect trade secrets,
272

Id. § 38 intro. note to ch. 4.
Id. § 38.
274 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000) (mail fraud); Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831
(2000); National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000).
275 See, e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case For A Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
427, 435 (1995) (“[T]he [state law] trade secret misappropriation tort fills a significant gap in the federal law
of intellectual property by enabling companies to safeguard their valuable but non-patentable innovations.”).
273
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usually in some form of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”).276 So far,
forty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted some version of the
UTSA.277 Second, trade secrets are protected under section 757 of the original
Restatement of Torts.278 While liability for misappropriation of trade secrets
was removed from the Restatement (Second) of Torts,279 courts often rely upon
the definition of a trade secret from the first Restatement.280 Third, trade
secrets are protected under the more recent Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition.281 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is the modern
restatement of the common law protection of a trade secret.282
Although the definition of “trade secret” under each of these formulations
is slightly different,283 the effect of each is to cover the same type of

276

Unif. Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433–67 (1990).
Id. at refs. & annots.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts felt that:

277
278
279

the law of Unfair Competition and Trade Regulation is no more dependent upon Tort law than it is
on many other general fields of the law and upon broad statutory developments, particularly at the
federal level. The Council formally reached the decision that these chapters no longer belong in the
Restatement of Torts, and they are omitted from this Second Restatement. If it should be later
decided that the law on these subjects ought to be restated, it will be done by separate restatements
on the subjects involved.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, introductory note to div. 9 (1977).
280 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 1.01[2].
281 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
282 Id. reporters’ note (also noting the applicability of the Restatement to UTSA cases).
283 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also defines trade secrets as “any information that can
be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford
an actual or potential economic advantage over others.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 39.
Trade secret is also defined in the comments to section 757 of the first Restatement of Torts. “A trade
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it.” RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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information.284 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition has the most
succinct definition of the three: “A trade secret is any information that can be
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others.”285
Almost any information can be a trade secret under this definition if it is
valuable and secret. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition does not
require that the information be contained in written form, if it can be
sufficiently defined.286 In fact, a trade secret can consist of the information
gained by employees in the process of performing their duties for their
employer.287 Thus, a trade secret can consist of transitory, ephemeral
information that is never recorded.288
Trade secret law does not create an exclusive right in information as such,
but rather protects certain information that is subject to reasonable efforts to
maintain its secrecy.289 This means that the owner of the information needs to
take certain steps to ensure that the information does not become generally
known to the public or to those in their industry.290 For example, the
information should not be disclosed to too many people291 and should be
284 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 1.01[2][a]. One
difference between the definition of trade secrets contained in the UTSA and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition on the one hand, and the definition in the Restatement of Torts section 757, is that section 757
states that information of short duration should not be protected as a trade secret, whereas the UTSA and
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition contain no such restriction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
285 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d. The drafters of the Restatement
intended this to be consistent with the definition of trade secrets under the UTSA. Id. cmt. b.
286 Id. § 39 cmt. d (“[t]here is no requirement that the information be incorporated or embodied in a
tangible form if it is otherwise sufficiently delineated.”).
287 Id. § 42 cmt. e. If the trade secret is developed in the course of the employee’s normal duties for the
employer, then the employer would own such trade secrets, even if the employee used the employee’s own
knowledge and skill to develop the trade secrets. Id. (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 397).
288 Id. § 39 cmt. d. This comment specifically distinguishes the modern rule from that stated in the first
Restatement of Torts, which did deny protection for information of short duration. See RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (“[A trade secret] differs from other secret information in a business (see § 759) in that it
is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business . . . . A trade secret is
a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business.”).
289 The term “secret” is used in the definition of trade secret in all three formulations. Unif. Trade Secrets
Act § 1(4); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
290 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (“Information known by persons in
addition to the trade secret owner can retain its status as a trade secret if it remains secret from others to whom
it has potential economic value.”); MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 1.05.
291 Id. § 39 cmt. g; see also id. cmt. f, reporters’ note (“[t]he precautions required of the trade secret owner
may increase with increasing dissemination.”).
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disclosed in confidence. Limited disclosure, even without a duty of
confidence, may not destroy the trade secret if the information is nevertheless
kept secret.292 Also, for those not subject to an implied duty of confidentiality,
the owner should have non-disclosure agreements with those that receive the
information. If the owner does not take these steps, the owner will not have a
trade secret protected under the law.
Even if the owner has taken all reasonable means to keep the information
secret, it may nevertheless become generally known. If it does, there is
nothing that the owner can do to recapture the trade secret.293 Therefore,
information otherwise protectable under trade secret law may be freely
available to all once it loses its confidential status and all exclusive rights will
disappear.294 This also means that whether information will be protected under
trade secret law requires litigation to prove that the information was, and
remains, secret at the time of the litigation.295 The owner will have the burden
to prove that it owns a trade secret.296
(ii) Duty of Confidence
Information is protected under trade secret law where there is a duty to
keep that information secret.
That obligation is created either by
implication,297 as through the duty of loyalty imposed on employees,298 or
expressly by contract.299

292

Id. § 39 cmt. f.
Id. (“If the information has become readily ascertainable from public sources so that no significant
benefit accrues to a person who relies instead on other means of acquisition, the information is in the public
domain and no longer protectable under the law of trade secrets.”); see also MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 1.03; 2
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR. & MONO. § 14:27 (4th ed. 2005).
294 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (“While the court is persuaded by the [Church of Scientology’s] evidence that those who
made the original postings likely gained the information through improper means, as no one outside the
Church or without a duty of confidence would have had access to those works, this does not negate the finding
that, once posted, the works lost their secrecy.”) (citations omitted); see also JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS
§ 4.04[3][f] (2004). DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93 (Ct. App. 2004).
295 See MILGRIM, supra note 13, §§ 15.01-.02.
296 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d.
297 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41(b); MILGRIM, supra note 13, §3.01.
298 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42; MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 5.02[1] (“The
relationship between an employer and an employee is a confidential one. The existence of such relationship
between employer and employee imposes a duty upon the employee not to use or disclose the employer’s
confidential information to the employer’s detriment.”).
299 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41(a) (1995); MILGRIM, supra note 13, §4.01.
293
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(iii) Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
What is prohibited by the UTSA, as well as the Restatements, is the
misappropriation of trade secrets.300 Unlike other forms of intellectual
property law that grant the owner exclusive rights in the underlying invention
or original expression, such as patent and copyright law, trade secret law does
not create a right in the information itself.301 Instead, trade secret law prohibits
the appropriation of that information by improper means.302 Thus, while a
patent owner may prohibit the use of the patented technology regardless of
how the infringer came by the technology, and regardless of fault, a trade
secret owner may only obtain a remedy where the alleged infringer has
obtained or disclosed secret information in an improper manner. If the alleged
infringer independently discovers the information, or obtains the information
by examining publicly available products and information, then the alleged
infringer cannot be found liable.303
Misappropriation is defined under the UTSA as
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade
secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to
know that his knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized
improper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty
to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or

300

Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 2, 3, 14 U.L.A. (1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 40; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
301 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c.
302 Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 2, 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40; RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
303 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43.
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(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or
had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
304
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.

This definition leaves someone free to obtain otherwise secret information
and to use it for a benefit without fear of liability if the information was not
obtained inappropriately.305 As stated in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, “[i]ndependent discovery and analysis of publicly available
products or information are not improper means of acquisition.”306 For
example, it is legal to purchase a competitor’s product and reverse engineer it
to determine any trade secret information.307 The Restatement provides the
following example:
A sells a drug compounded from a secret formula. B, a competing
drug manufacturer, purchases a quantity of A’s drug on the open
market and learns the formula through scientific analysis. B then
begins to market a similar product. B has not acquired A’s trade
308
secret by improper means.

(b) Protection of Confidential Relationships
The limitation of trade secret protection to misappropriation of trade secrets
has led some to argue that this form of intellectual property is directed more to
protecting certain confidential relationships rather than creating a property
right in the particular secret information.309 Professor Thomas Ward points
out, “trade secrets [can be seen] as no more than the amalgam of rights and
duties that arise between discrete persons under contract law, tort law, and trust
law, rather than a right in some ‘thing’ that can be asserted against the
world.”310

304

Unif. Trade Secrets Act §1(2).
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) (“The public at
large remain[s] free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering of products in the
public domain or by independent creation.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a
(“The owner of a trade secret does not have an exclusive right to possession or use of the secret information.
Protection is available only against a wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade secret.”).
306 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43.
307 Id. § 43 cmt. b.
308 Id. § 43 cmt. b, illus. 1.
309 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998) (“[T]rade secret law is merely a collection of other legal norms—contract, fraud,
and the like—united only by the fact that they are used to protect secret information.”).
310 WARD, supra note 11, § 1:11.
305
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The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition claims, in the comments to
section 39, that one interest of the early trade secrets cases was to enforce a
level of ethical behavior and fair competition in the business environment.311
This goal includes imposing upon those with knowledge of certain confidential
information a duty to keep that information secret.312 By enforcing a code of
conduct on certain legal relationships, the Restatement encourages the
dissemination of secret information in limited circumstances and the use of
confidential information in an efficient manner. For example, by imposing a
general duty of confidentiality upon employees, an employer can safely
disclose secret information to help an employee in her job, further developing
the employer’s business.313
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition notes in the discussion of
the development of trade secret doctrine, however, that a property analysis of
trade secrets was needed in order to obtain injunctive relief.314 Even so, many
early cases “concluded that the essence of a trade secret action is a breach of
confidence or other improper conduct, sometimes explicitly disavowing any
property dimension to a trade secret.”315 In particular, the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition notes that the first Restatement of Torts, section 757,
specifically rejected the property theory of trade secrets: “The influential
formulation in section 757 of the Restatement of Torts (1939), reporting that
the property conception ‘has been frequently advanced and rejected,’
concluded that the prevailing theory of liability rests on ‘a general duty of good
faith.’”316
Milgrim argues that such intellectual analysis of the nature of trade secrets
is subject to “a certain opaqueness.”317 In his view, it is clear that a trade
secret is property and the property rights in a trade secret are the rights “to use
and disclose it to others subject to restrictions on their use and disclosure.”318
He compares the property right to that of a copyright, and the discussion of the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition as “a cascade of underanalyzed
311

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a.
Id. § 41.
313 Id. § 39 cmt. a (“The rules protecting trade secrets also promote the efficient exploitation of knowledge
by discouraging the unproductive hoarding of useful information and facilitating disclosure to employees,
agents, licensees, and others who can assist in its productive use.”).
314 Id. § 39 cmt. b.
315 Id.
316 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939)).
317 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 2.01.
318 Id.
312
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notions.”319 Milgrim strongly believes that this discussion has created “more
conceptual heat than light,”320 in no small part because courts have generally
accepted that trade secrets are a form of property.321 Other reasons supporting
the property view of trade secrets, according to Milgrim, are that trade secrets
are assignable,322 have been accepted as property contributed in exchange for a
stock issuance,323 may be the subject of a trust,324 may pass by will or intestate
succession,325 and may be property of a bankruptcy estate.326
(c) Trade Secret Most Likely General Intangible, but . . .
In applying the two part test to trade secrets, it is easiest to start with the
second question: Is a trade secret assignable? As the Supreme Court stated in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the answer is clearly yes.327 While there may be
issues relating to the right of the assignor to keep328 or to further assign329 a
trade secret, nevertheless the law recognizes the transfer of the trade secret
from one party to another party.330 Therefore, in applying the two part test, the
question of assignability falls squarely on the side of characterizing a trade
secret as a general intangible.
With respect to the first question, whether trade secret law vindicates an
interest in the owner ancillary to the underlying secret information, the answer
is less clear. Obviously, many trade secrets have enormous intrinsic value
apart from the identity of the owner. The secret formula to the Coca-Cola soft
drink is a prime example. Such trade secrets are easily reducible to tangible
form, clearly exist apart from their creators, and can be transferred to and
owned by someone wholly unrelated to the original creator. In this way, a
319 Id. (“Thus, comment b emits a cascade of underanalyzed notions to the effect that courts protect trade
secrets sometimes under property theories, sometimes under breach of good faith theories and sometimes
under general prohibition against unfair methods of competition.”).
320 Id.
321 Id. § 2.01 n.15.
322 Id. § 2.02.
323 Id. § 2.03.
324 Id. § 2.04.
325 Id. § 2.05 (Milgrim concedes that a trade secret “does not lend itself to such transmission as readily as
other forms of property.”).
326 Id. § 2.06. The Bankruptcy Code includes trade secret in its definition of intellectual property.
11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)(A) (2000).
327 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (holding trade secrets are assignable); see
also Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971).
328 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 2.02[1].
329 Id. § 2.02[2].
330 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002; Milgrim, supra note 13, §2.02.

SMITHGALLEYFINAL

2005]

1/31/2006 12:28 PM

GENERAL INTANGIBLE OR COMMERCIAL TORT

141

trade secret appears to be a form of intellectual property that exhibits many of
the characteristics of intangible personal property which should be treated as a
general intangible. Roger Milgrim describes the property right as follows:
“Quite simply, it is the right of the owner of the trade secret to use and disclose
it to others subject to restrictions on their use and disclosure.”331
Nevertheless, a trade secret is a form of intangible property that has several
characteristics that distinguish it from the primary forms of intellectual
property. Whether a trade secret is a form of property is not the controlling
issue in deciding whether to characterize it as a general intangible or
commercial tort. Even accepting Milgrim’s persuasive argument that a trade
secret is property,332 it is a less absolute form of property. In particular,
comparing the nature of trade secrets as property to patents, trademarks, and
copyrights points out some of the distinct differences between trade secrets
compared to those primary forms of intellectual property. These differences
suggest that perhaps some trade secrets may be better analyzed as commercial
torts rather than general intangibles under Article 9.
First, unlike a patent, trademark, or copyright, whether a person owns a
trade secret can never be determined from publicly available facts. Certainly, a
person may publicly claim to have a trade secret, but that assertion can never
amount to more than a claim, because the act of publicly proving its existence
destroys it.333 By comparison, patents and trademarks are easily determined by
a review of publicly available facts.334 Copyrights are a little more difficult
because one must separate out the copyrightable original expression;335
nevertheless, such expression is commonly publicly available.
Second, it is not possible to create a registration system for trade secrets
because any public registration of the nature of a trade secret would destroy its
existence. By contrast, a patent only exists once the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) has issued the patent.336 Trademarks and copyrights, while not

331

MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 2.01.
See supra notes 317–326 and accompanying text.
333 See supra notes 289–96 and accompanying text regarding the requirement of secrecy for a trade secret.
334 Searches of issued patents and certain pending patent applications, as well as trademark registrations
and all pending trademark applications, can be made at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
website. See http://www.uspto.gov. Further, there are private trademark searching agencies.
335 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 2.01.
336 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). Generally, pending patent applications are kept confidential until publication
of the application eighteen months after filing, 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) – (b), although publication destroys any
trade secrets contained in the application, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c (1995)
332
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requiring registration for their existence, can be, and often are, registered.337
Thus the three primary forms of intellectual property have registration systems,
that provide public notice of their existence and the scope of protection.
Third, in all cases, a party claiming to own a trade secret carries the burden
of sufficiently defining what information is claimed as secret338 as well as
proving that the owner used reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.339 With
patents, trademarks, and copyrights, registration creates a presumption of
validity.340
Finally, trade secrets do not grant the owner the general power to exclude
others from utilizing the information to the benefit of the owner’s business,
which most forms of intellectual property grant. Instead, a trade secret
“merely limits the means by which others are free to appropriate the ‘things’
that satisfy the definition of a ‘secret.’”341 There must be an illegal act, the
misappropriation of the information, that precedes the power to prevent the use
of the information. That is to say, the trade secret right is not a right as against
the world, but only against those under a duty to maintain the secrecy of the
information contained in the trade secret. In this regard, it is much more of a
tort right than a traditional property right.
By comparison, the primary forms of intellectual property include the
exclusive rights over the subject matter as against the world, regardless of
fault. A patent grants the owner the power to prevent anyone from making,
using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the invention.342 Fault is not an
element of a patent infringement claim—a patent owner may prevent
infringement even by an innocent infringer.343 Nor is fault required for

(“Thus, for matter disclosed in the patent, issuance terminates the secrecy required for continued protection as
a trade secret, even if the patent is subsequently declared invalid.”).
337 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000) (trademarks may be registered with the PTO); 17 U.S.C. §§ 409, 410 (2000)
(copyrights may be registered with the Copyright Office); MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 22.10 (there are also
state registration statutes).
338 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d.
339 Id. § 40 cmt. a.
340 15 U.S.C. § 1057 (certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of validity of registered
trademark); 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (registration of copyright within five years of publication constitutes prima
facie evidence of validity); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (patent presumed valid).
341 See WARD, supra note 11, § 1:11.
342 17 U.S.C. § 271(a).
343 Id.; JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 4 PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 20:4 (2d ed. 2005) (“There is no
intent element to direct infringement. It is immaterial whether the manufacturer knew or was ignorant of the
fact that the article as made and sold infringed the patent.”) (footnotes omitted).
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trademark infringement.344
All that is required to prove trademark
infringement is that the use of a mark is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
deception.345 A copyright owner is specifically granted several enumerated
exclusive rights to a copyright, including the rights to make copies, prepare
derivative works, and distribute copies.346 Violating any of these exclusive
rights creates liability for copyright infringement, regardless of the intent of the
actor.347
Further, does it make sense to call something a general intangible if we
have to litigate whether it even exists348 or if its existence can evaporate
without any misfeasance by the putative trade secret owner?349 If the critics of
the property view are correct, the right exists to protect confidential
relationships, and so can be said to vindicate the interest in the holder of the
right to be free from having those under a duty of confidentiality from
disclosing what they know. There is certainly an argument for this point of
view. Of necessity, there is no public database of the information that is secret.
The trade secret property can easily evaporate if the information is publicly
disclosed, regardless of how it is disclosed. As a result, it is difficult to know
whether there is any property at all.
Perhaps a distinction should be made between those trade secrets that have
been reduced to tangible form and those that represent the more ephemeral
types of trade secrets. For example, a pending patent application that has not
yet been published may contain trade secrets, at least until it is published.350
The patent application must contain a full written description of the
invention,351 including the best mode of practicing the invention,352 and so
344 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:124 (“A mistaken, good faith belief will not excuse otherwise illegal
infringement . . . .”).
345 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (infringement of a registered mark); § 1127(a)(1)(A) (infringement of
unregistered mark).
346 17 U.S.C. § 106.
347 Id. § 501. If the infringement is willful, the copyright owner may be able to obtain enhanced statutory
damages of up to $150,000. Id. § 504(c)(2).
348 See MILGRIM, supra note 13, §1.03 (“Fundamentally, existence of a trade secret is a question of fact
for determination by the trier of fact, secrecy being a basic element of any claimed trade secret.”) (citations
omitted).
349 See id. (“However, a discoverer of a trade secret may forfeit protection if the entire combination of its
aspects is disclosed in several publications.”).
350 Patent applications are initially kept confidential. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2000). Although there is now a
presumption that applications should be published eighteen months after the date of filing, id. § 122(b)(1)(A),
nevertheless there are certain exceptions to this presumption, such as where an applicant requests that it not be
published and the applicant has not filed the application in any other country, id. § 122(b)(2)(B).
351 Id. § 112 (requirements for specification).
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likely represents a clear example of a trade secret that has been reduced to a
tangible form. Patent applications may be assigned,353 and so represent a form
of trade secret that should be treated as a general intangible. If a trade secret
embodies information that is clearly reduced to tangible, written form in the
nature of a patent application, and can easily be assigned as with a patent
application, then it should be treated as a general intangible.
However, where the trade secret is ephemeral or represents knowledge
known by certain employees but not reduced to tangible form, the trade secret
is more properly characterized as a commercial tort. This is markedly so
where “[t]he rules governing liability for the appropriation of trade secrets play
a more central role in regulating the behavior of employees after the
termination of the employment relationship.”354 According to Milgrim, “[t]he
great majority of reported trade secret cases arise in the context of the
employer-employee relationship.”355 As he points out, aggressive enforcement
of trade secret protection runs the risk of preventing an employee with trade
secret knowledge from pursuing the employee’s livelihood in a meaningful
way.356 While courts have recognized the right of an employer to protect the
valuable trade secrets known by former employees,357 this protection is
counterbalanced by the recognition of a worker’s right to use the skills and
experience the worker gained while working for a former employer.358
Certain legal doctrines, such as the inevitable disclosure doctrine,359 or the
doctrine that where an employee is specifically hired to create inventions for
the employer, the employer owns the trade secret,360 exist to protect employers
from having their former employees disclose trade secrets to their new
employers. In such situations, however, the former employer will often have
an added burden beyond merely showing that a protectable trade secret
exists.361 An employer may be expected to show additional facts, for example,
an employee having knowledge of specialized information about the employer,
352

Id.
Id. § 261.
354 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. b (1995).
355 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 5.01.
356 Id.
357 Id. § 5.02[2].
358 Id. § 5.02[3][a].
359 Id. § 5.02[3][d].
360 Id. § 5.02[4][a].
361 Id. § 5.02[3][c] (“On the other hand, where there is no restrictive covenant, the plaintiff-employer of
such a previously skilled employee may have the burden of carefully identifying its trade secret and isolating it
from the defendant ex-employee’s prior and job-enhanced skills.”).
353
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the inability of competitors to develop the information themselves, or the
former employee absconding with some tangible form of the information.362
In such circumstances, a highly fact-based analysis of the existence of the
trade secret, the relative rights and duties of the parties, and the public policy
considerations such as an employee’s right to practice a trade, will likely be
necessary.
Therefore, where protection of a trade secret involves
considerations, relating to the particular nature of the relationship between the
parties, trade secret law is more focused on issues ancillary to protecting the
underlying secret information. In such a case, perhaps the trade secret is more
properly characterized as a commercial tort.
This characterization makes sense given the circumstances in which a
lender would come to own a trade secret. If a borrower defaults because the
business is failing, many employees, particularly technically skilled workers,
will likely leave to work for competitors in the same industry. Assuming the
borrower granted a security interest in collateral, including general intangibles
(including after acquired collateral), the secured party will likely repossess the
general intangibles when it repossesses the assets of the borrower. If all trade
secrets are defined as general intangibles, the secured party would in effect
have a right to the trade secrets contained in the minds of the former
employees, granting the bank—or someone who buys the general intangibles
in a sale of the collateral—a right to sue those former employees to prevent the
disclosure of the trade secrets to their new employers. Apart from the
difficulty in proving such a case, the lender would be suing the former
employees of the now defunct business and preventing them from pursuing
their trade.
If the borrower instead files a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, many of
those same employees would remain employed by the borrower. Here, the
situation is even more remarkable. Such trade secrets would be property of the
estate363 and subject to the automatic stay.364 The secured lender would
initially be prohibited from repossessing the trade secrets.365 However, a
secured lender would be able to make a claim that it has a perfected security
interest in the trade secret knowledge of the current employees and could
request relief from the automatic stay in order to take possession and sell those
362
363
364
365

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995).
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
Id. § 362(a).
Id. § 362(a)(3).
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secrets.366 While the borrower could likely make a cogent argument that such
trade secrets are necessary for the reorganization of the business,367 the
bankruptcy court would have to hold a hearing on the nature of the trade
secrets and their value.368 The court could grant relief from the stay, which
would allow the creditor to foreclose on the borrower’s trade secrets.369 More
likely, the court will find the trade secrets necessary for the reorganization of
the debtor and order the borrower to grant the secured lender adequate
protection370 to maintain the value of the secured party’s security interest, often
in the form of additional liens on other property.371
In either of these scenarios, the interests of the employees and the borrower
are better protected by characterizing the trade secret knowledge as a
commercial tort, requiring that it be described with specificity in the security
agreement, and preventing the creation of a lien on after acquired trade secret
knowledge.
3. Right of Publicity
The right of publicity has been described by one commentator as the right
of a person to control the use of his or her persona for commercial purposes.372
The right of publicity had its genesis in the right of privacy,373 which in turn
developed out of an influential article written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis, entitled The Right of Privacy.374 The right of privacy was further
refined into four separate torts in an article by William Prosser,375 which were
then included in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.376
366

Id. § 362(d).
Id. § 362(d)(2)(B).
368 Id. § 362(d); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 361.04, 362.08 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 15th ed. 1996) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY].
369 11 U.S.C. § 362(f); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 368, ¶ 362.07.
370 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
371 Id. § 361(2); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 368, ¶ 361.03[3].
372 MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 46, at 528; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
373 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (“The principal historical antecedent of
the right of publicity is the right of privacy.”).
374 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
375 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
376 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I (1977). The Restatement built upon the
scholarly work of William Prosser, who described the right of privacy incorporating four torts: “unreasonable
intrusions upon another’s seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, publicity placing another in a false light,
and the appropriation for the defendant’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (citing Prosser, supra note 375).
367
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The right of publicity generally refers to the use of a person’s name or
likeness, although the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also
prohibits the appropriation of “other indicia of identity,”377 which may include
use or imitation of a person’s voice or other identifying features.378 The right
of publicity is recognized in half the states, either by statute or common law.379
The right of publicity, as currently understood, derived from the specific
privacy tort described as the “appropriation” tort.380 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts states, “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.”381 However, the privacy appropriation tort protects the plaintiff
against harm to both personal and commercial interests when the plaintiff’s
identity has been exploited by a third party without permission.382
Because the right of publicity is only recognized in half of the states, in the
other half of the states, presumably, there is no general intangible publicity
right that may function as collateral under Article 9.383 Instead, a person
attempting to grant a security interest in the right to be free from use of his or
her identity in commerce without permission would be relying on the privacy
tort. As a result, a secured party would likely have to perfect the right
according to the commercial tort rules, if at all. It is also likely that a celebrity
would meet the requirement that the appropriation tort be a commercial tort
because the tort arises by definition “in the course of the claimant’s business or
profession.”384 However, because of the difficulty in pledging commercial
torts, this, of course, makes the right that much less valuable an asset for an
individual.

377

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46.
Id. § 46 cmt. d. (the use of voice or “performing persona” may create liability).
379 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 6.1.
380 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b; see also Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1328-32 (2002) (discussing the development of the right of publicity).
381 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
382 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b.
383 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1335 (“For the debtor-creditor system to recognize
publicity rights and treat them as assets, those rights would have to exist in the applicable jurisdiction.
Currently it is unclear how many states do, or probably would, recognize an alienable property interest in the
human persona.”). The Jacoby & Zimmerman article primarily focuses on whether the right of publicity
should be treated as property of the estate in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case and not whether such right should be
treated as a general intangible under Article 9. Id. at 1342–43.
384 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13)(B)(i) (2000).
378
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(a) Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person’s Identity: The
Right of Publicity
In the leading treatise on the right of publicity, Professor McCarthy states
that the right of publicity should be treated as any other property right which
may be sold or licensed.385 It is Professor McCarthy’s belief that a right of
publicity should be fully assignable, and thus alienable to a third party.386 This
allows the celebrity to maximize the value of the celebrity’s publicity right and
gives the assignee full control over the use of the celebrity’s persona.387
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition describes a cause of action
for violation of a right of publicity arises when “[o]ne who appropriates the
commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.”388
While this statement of the law could be read only to recognize liability for
a violation of a right of publicity and not a stand alone property right, in the
reporters’ notes, the Restatement clearly stands for the proposition that “[t]he
interest in the commercial value of a person’s identity is in the nature of a
property right and is freely assignable to others.”389 If the right is assigned, the
assignor is prohibited from “exploiting” the right of publicity in a way that
conflicts with the assignment, and further, is deemed to have consented to the
use of his or her name and likeness by the assignee.390 “Thus, conduct by the
assignee that would otherwise violate the publicity or privacy rights of the
assignor is privileged if the use is within the terms of the assignment.”391
Even though the right of publicity has its historical roots in the tort of
privacy,392 both the McCarthy treatise and the Restatement take the position
that the right is alienable regardless of that history.393 Based on that reasoning,
385

PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10:14.
Id.
387 Id.
388 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
389 Id. § 46 cmt. g (emphasis added).
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1357–58 (noting that “publicity rights have never been
completely severed from their roots in privacy, and the property-privacy tension is clearly implicated by the
prospect of placing publicity rights in the hands of the highest bidder as a result of debt collection or
bankruptcy.”).
393 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10:14; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §
46 cmt. g (1995).
386
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in those states that have recognized the right of publicity as distinct from the
right of privacy, where the right is fully assignable,394 it should function as a
general intangible under Article 9. Any possible conflict between the
historical non-assignability of a personal tort based on invasion of privacy and
the full alienability of the right of publicity should be resolved in favor of
permitting transfer of the individual’s publicity right.395
The reporters’ notes do provide a caveat to the broad property right basis
for protection: “an assignment of the right of publicity transfers only the right
to exploit the commercial value of the assignor’s identity; the personal interests
protected under the right of privacy are not transferable, and thus invasions of
those rights by third persons remain actionable by the assignor.”396
This is a curious limitation. Given that “the right of publicity protects an
individual’s interest in personal dignity and autonomy”397 akin to a right of
privacy, could this be a distinction without a difference? In other words, if a
person retains the right to sue for an invasion of privacy based on false light,
even if that person has transferred the right of publicity, what is the right of
publicity really worth? Is it truly a stand alone right, in the nature of property,
or does it retain its strong links to the tort of the invasion of privacy and
protection of the interest of the celebrity to be free from not having his or her
name or likeness used commercially without permission? If so, is it a right that
can really ever be foreclosed upon and sold to repay a loan?

394

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g (1995).
See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1357–67.

395

An exemption for publicity rights [from treating them as assets in the debtor-creditor system]
would have to proceed, of course, from an assumption that the associational and dignitary interests
at stake outweigh the benefits of treating these rights like other ordinary assets in the debtorcreditor system. We question whether such an assumption is valid.
Id. at 1361. Not all commentators agree that the right of publicity should be treated as fully separate from the
underlying personal interest of the individual. See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a
Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 408–09 (1999) (“The problem is that in the process of defining
the right of publicity as a strictly economic property right (even while tort law clung to that fourth prong of
privacy), the right of publicity lost a crucial part of its raison d’être as a right based on, and protective of,
personal autonomy.”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
151.
396 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g.
397 Id. § 46 cmt. c.
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The Restatement posits the following example to highlight the distinction:
A, a famous actress, assigns to B the right to exploit the commercial
value of A’s identity. C, without the permission of either A or B,
markets posters that feature A’s picture in a pose that places A before
the public in a false light. C is subject to liability to B, but not to A,
for an appropriation of the commercial value of A’s identity under the
rule stated in this Section. C is subject to liability to A, but not to B,
for placing A before the public in a false light under the rule stated in
398
Restatement, Second, Torts § 652E.

This example stands for the proposition that that rights of publicity are, and
should be, fully alienable. It also reinforces the idea that a person has several
different interests tied up in his or her identity: in the example the interest, or
more appropriately the right to use one’s identity for trade, and the interest in
being free from being placed before the public in a false light. They appear to
exist separate from each other, one alienable, one not.
What if the example is put in an Article 9 default, repossession and sale
context? As revised, the facts might go like this:
A, a famous actress, grants a security interest to B in the commercial
value of A’s identity, to secure repayment of a loan. A defaults, and
so B exercises its right to “repossess” under UCC sections 9-601 to
9-625, and takes possession of A’s right of publicity. In order for this
to be a meaningful transfer, B would have to receive an assignment of
all of A’s right of publicity. B then sells—reassigns—the right to C,
through a private sale. Assuming that the sale is commercially
reasonable, C is the owner of A’s identity for commercial use. C then
uses A’s identity to market products without A’s consent.

According to the Restatement, the assignment and subsequent sale of A’s
right to publicity in the above example should be fully permitted. In fact, it is
a logical consequence of the acceptance of the concept of the full alienability
of a right of publicity.399 But several questions arise from this conclusion.
First, is A forever estopped from endorsing a product or service, even if the
398 Id. § 46 cmt. g, illus. 1; see MJ & Partners Rest. Ltd. P’ship v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (exclusive licensee of Michael Jordan’s right of publicity has standing to sue for misappropriation of
that right).
399 Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1362 (“Furthermore, the very concept of alienability means
that the law contemplates the real possibility that celebrities will assign all or part of the right to use their
personas to others—at which point they necessarily give up, albeit voluntarily, any legal right to object to how
the assignee uses their identities in the future.”).
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original assignee no longer “owns” her right of publicity? Presumably so,
because she assigned that right to B.400 Would a movie studio be foreclosed
from using A’s name or likeness to promote a movie she is in if C did not
consent? Probably not, because the studio would only be promoting the truth
about its movie—that A is in it. This is most likely a form of nominative fair
use.401 But movie merchandising containing images of A is probably
prohibited because of the commercial nature of the use of a celebrity’s name or
likeness. 402
What if C uses A’s identity to market products that A would not otherwise
endorse? A would have no claim for misappropriation of her identity because
she no longer owns the right to use her identity for purposes of trade. Could A
sue under some other theory? This problem demonstrates where the
bifurcation of the identity of a celebrity may become problematic. If A
believes that she is portrayed in a false light because of the implied
endorsement of a product she does not like, it would seem that she could bring
a cause of action under invasion of privacy. For example, if actress A does not
drink, and C uses her name and likeness to promote a brand of beer,403 A may
have both a defamation tort and a false light tort under Restatement (Second)
of Torts sections 565 and 625E, respectively404 In addition, she may have a
deceptive marketing claim under Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
section 4.405
If C is limited, however, in the products that it can sell using the celebrity’s
name and likeness, because of possible liability to A for violation of her
privacy rights, can it be said that C really owns A’s right of publicity?
Conversely, if A is estopped from making claims against C regardless of the
400 Id. at 1355 (citing Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1953)
(holding that a baseball player could not transfer exclusive rights to use his image on a baseball card and then
turn around and grant exclusive rights for the same purpose to someone else.)) (“Clearly, the celebrity must
refrain from exercising the right of publicity once it is owned by someone else so as not to negate the value of
the asset that has been transferred.”).
401 See MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 11:45.
402 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1356 (“For example, a model like Cindy Crawford earns
her livelihood wearing clothes and makeup designed by others. In some instances, when she shows the clothes
and makeup she is pursuing her primary career as a fashion model. In others, she may be exhibiting herself in
the clothes or makeup specifically to endorse them as products. Distinguishing one from the other might be
difficult, but courts are no strangers to this kind of line-drawing . . . .”).
403 Cf. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692–94 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding former major
league baseball pitcher, who was a recovering alcoholic, had stated an adequate claim under California
statutory and common law for misappropriation of his likeness in an advertisement for beer).
404 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
405 Id.
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nature of the products C is marketing, does that not deprive her of the ability to
protect her name and reputation guaranteed under the right of publicity?
(b) Right of Publicity Most Likely a General Intangible, but . . .
The right of publicity, where recognized as a right that is separate from the
right of privacy, would tend to fall into the category of general intangible. As
suggested by Professor McCarthy, this is the trend in many states, where the
right of publicity is protected for upwards of 100 years after a celebrity’s
death.406 Thus, it is easy to say that the right stands apart from an interest in
the celebrity where the celebrity does not need to be alive for the right to be
protected. Also, it is increasingly recognized as transferable right, both during
the celebrity’s life and after death.407 Lisa Marie Presley sold rights to her
father’s name and likeness for $100 million, and Elvis Presley is listed as
Forbes’ top earning dead celebrity, bringing in a total of $40 million in
2003.408
There is a significant trend to recognize the right of publicity as a fully
assignable and inheritable right. Certainly, this is likely to maximize the value
of the right, because advertisers are likely to increase the price they are willing
to pay for the right if they can obtain “ownership” of a celebrity’s persona for
marketing purposes. This will also maximize the right’s value as a piece of
commercial property, because a lender is more likely to accept a right of
publicity as collateral if the right is fully alienable. This means that a right of
publicity is likely to be considered a general intangible.
Even so, there are aspects of this right that do not fit well with such a
categorization, particularly if the celebrity is still alive. For example,
following Professor McCarthy’s view, the right should be fully alienable.409
This would allow a secured creditor to foreclose and sell the asset to seek
repayment of the loan secured by the right. Only in this way can the creditor
fully use the right as collateral.410
406

PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 6:8.
Id. § 10:13.
408 Lisa DiCarlo, Reaping Millions After Death, FORBES.COM, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.forbes.com/
business/2004/10/25/cx_ld_1025deadcelebsintro.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). See also Jacoby &
Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1331–32 (describing efforts by singer David Bowie, baseball player Frank
Thomas, and rap singer Sean Combs to “securitize the value of their identities”).
409 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10:14.
410 Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1364 (“[T]he overall philosophy of our current debtorcreditor system puts the interests of the creditor in forcing the sale of the debtor’s assets—publicity rights or
otherwise—ahead of the preferences of the delinquent debtor.”).
407
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But this has some strange and unwelcome consequences, both for the
celebrity and also for the public. For example, assume that John Q. Celeb
signs a security agreement with First Bank that lists “general intangibles” as a
type of collateral covered by the bank’s security interest. As a result, if the
right is a general intangible, Celeb will have granted a security interest in his
right of publicity to First Bank without specifically listing it.
When Celeb defaults on the payment, First Bank will have a right to
repossess Celeb’s right of publicity.411 First Bank, in order to seek repayment
of the loan, can then proceed with a sale of Celeb’s publicity right through
either a public or private sale. The buyer will obtain full ownership of that
right.412 Assuming Celeb’s right of publicity is fully alienable, the owner of
the right can use Celeb’s name and likeness to sell any product the owner
wishes, regardless of the impact such marketing would have on the celebrity.
If not, saying that the right is fully alienable would have no meaning. Celeb’s
publicity right must transfer without any restrictions, otherwise Celeb’s
publicity right would have much less value.
To be alienable would mean that Celeb’s name and likeness can appear in
advertising for products that Celeb does not endorse and in a form to which the
celebrity does not consent. Even if Celeb dislikes the product, no action may
lie, presumably, because the advertiser either owns or has licensed from the
owner the celebrity’s publicity right. This immediately raises the specter of a
claim by Celeb for false endorsement, assuming the nature of the product is
anathema to Celeb. Conversely, perhaps the advertiser of Celeb’s right of
publicity has a cause of action to prevent Celeb from interfering with the
advertiser’s use of Celeb’s name and likeness.
Professor McCarthy suggests that such a view is correct; a celebrity should
be fully capable of assigning his or her right of publicity without restriction.413
He posits several reasons why there are circumstances when it is appropriate to
assign a right of publicity, such as assigning the right to a corporation for tax
purposes414 or for estate planning purposes while the celebrity is alive.415 He
notes that the courts possess the power to undo transfers made under duress or
due to fraud or mistake, “[b]ut in the ordinary situation of a freely bargained
411

U.C.C. §§ 9-601, 9-609 (2000).
Id. § 9-401.
413 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10.14. Other commentators agree. See, e.g., Jacoby &
Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1357–67.
414 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10:14.
415 Id. § 10:14.
412
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assignment devoid of any overtones of pressure or unfair advantage, the courts
should treat persons as freely consenting adults, capable of adequately
protecting themselves in assignments of the right of publicity.”416
The problem with this scenario is that if the right of publicity is treated as a
general intangible, the assignment can be made without any explicit reference
to the celebrity’s publicity right—the mere mention of “general intangibles”
would capture that right in the security agreement. Any default would trigger
the right to repossess and sell the right,417 including mere technical defaults to
the loan. Article 9 does not appear to allow for a different result if the right of
publicity is to be treated as a general intangible.418
CONCLUSION
With the adoption of Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9, the
states have added a new form of collateral available to creditors—commercial
torts. With this expansion of the types of collateral to include commercial
torts, it is appropriate to reevaluate whether the characterization of the broad
collection of rights termed intellectual property as general intangibles is
appropriate. While it appears that the drafters of Revised Article 9 intended
for the primary forms of federally protected intellectual property, namely
patents, trademarks, and copyrights, to be so categorized, the same is not
necessarily true of state-based and secondary intellectual property rights.
When considering the co-relative nature of these rights—the protection of
interests relating to the owner of the rights—and the inability to transfer such
rights in a meaningful way, it is likely that a strong argument can be made that
they should be treated as commercial torts as opposed to general intangibles.
This will limit creditors’ ability to obtain perfected security interests in such
intellectual property rights, and allow the debtor, or the trustee in bankruptcy,
to avoid the effect of such security interests.
Whether this has a positive or negative impact on the business of lending is
questionable. In some cases, this will have the positive impact of avoiding
overly aggressive behavior by lenders in a way that inhibits commerce, such as
those claiming a security interest in the ephemeral trade secret knowledge of
employees. However, it may cause the value of such information to decline in
416
417
418

Id.
U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000).
Id.

SMITHGALLEYFINAL

2005]

1/31/2006 12:28 PM

GENERAL INTANGIBLE OR COMMERCIAL TORT

155

the marketplace if creditors cannot rely on such collateral to seek repayment in
the event of default. This is likely true with moral rights and the right of
publicity.
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